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I Comments I
Religion and the Three Wisemen: A




We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
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reminder of how to live in this world with virtue, dignity, and grace.
The author would like to note that since the foregoing Comment contains many
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governed-that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it.
1
On July 4, 1776, these words gave birth to a new nation, a nation
whose people were long starved for a government that would promote
individual liberties and protect them from state sponsored persecution,
particularly religious persecution.2 Cognizant of these desires and
expectations, our forefathers ratified the First Amendment as a
mechanism that would guarantee religious freedom, equality, and
toleration.3 Our forefathers accomplished this goal through the simple
phrase "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
4
Fueling the citizens' desire for religious liberty and informing our
forefathers' decision to incorporate a guarantee of religious freedom into
the Bill of Rights were the social and political writings of influential
European philosophers.5 Not only did the works of these philosophers
influence the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom, 6 they
were also influential in identifying the limits of this guarantee.7. Indeed,
the ideals contained in these philosophical works often informed the
United States Supreme Court in its attempt to resolve issues of free
religious exercise and non-establishment. 8
The extent to which the government may use religion' in its effort to
create a national identity is one of the more prevalent issues faced by the
Court.9 Perhaps the most explicit example of this phenomenon occurred
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. See Brett Thompson, Locke v. Davey: The Fine Line Between Free Exercise and
Establishment, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2005) (explaining that American
colonists were concerned with religious liberty and the ability to freely dissent from
religious tenets without suffering persecution).
3. See id. (explaining that concerns regarding religious liberty and freedom from
persecution were the impetus for the First Amendment).
4. U.S.CoNST. amend. I.
5. Interview with Dr. Giacomo Gambino, Professor of Western Political Thought,
Muhlenberg College, in Allentown, Pa. (Nov. 12, 2003).
6. E.g., Matthew C. Berger, One Nation Indivisible: How Congress's Addition of
"Under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance Offends the Original Intent of the
Establishment Clause, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 629, 641 (2006) (explaining that John Locke
heavily influenced Thomas Jefferson in the latter's penmanship of the Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom, which was one of the major precursors to the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment).
7. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 540 (1997) (explaining that certain
limitations on the scope of religious exercise have been associated with the philosophy of
John Locke).
8. See generally id.
9. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (involving a challenge to an
Alabama law that authorized teachers to set aside one minute at the start of each day for a
moment of silent meditation or voluntary prayer); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
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after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On that infamous night,
President George W. Bush addressed the nation and concluded his
remarks with the words "God Bless America."' In the days, weeks, and
months that followed, the American people uttered and displayed the
phrase "God Bless America" countless times. These words of
"ceremonial deism"'' resulted in a meteoric increase in national pride
and national unity,12 which cultivated a public culture and national
identity that explicitly embraced God and religion.
13
The governmental use of religion in shaping a national identity is
not limited to explicit actions such as the President's Address of
September 11, 2001; seemingly benign governmental use of religion can
affect public culture and national identity just as dramatically.
14
Historically, it is the province of the judiciary to utilize the First
Amendment in defining the extent to which government may use religion
in its attempt to create or maintain a public culture or a national
identity. 15 In extrapolating the extent of the religious rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment, courts have often identified and deferred to the
conceptions of our founding fathers,' 6 reasoning that these notions
U.S. 203 (1963) (involving a challenge to school sponsored Bible reading in public
schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (challenging the ability of state officials to
compose an official school prayer and require its recitation in public schools).
10. President's Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 37 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 37 (Sept. 11, 2001).
11. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36 (2004) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (In this opinion, Justice O'Connor coined the phrase "ceremonial deism"
in reference to the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Phrases falling under
the umbrella of "ceremonial deism," which include "In God We Trust," are forms of
religious speech because they involve "references to God and invocations of divine
assistance" that "can serve to solemnize an occasion instead of invoking divine
provenance." O'Connor asserted that governmental use of ceremonial deism is justified
because any "reasonable observer... fully aware of our national history... would not
perceive these acknowledgements as signifying a government endorsement of religion, or
even of religion over non-religion.").
12. See Gary Langer, ABC News, Still Proud to Be an American,
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/dailynews/septl l -yearlaterpoll020910.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2006).
13. See id.
14. See Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 36 (explaining that the phrases "under God" and "In
God We Trust" are phrases of ceremonial deism, which are religious invocations that
have been ingrained in the American political psyche and therefore do not pose any threat
of implying that the government is attempting to establish any particular religion).
15. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
16. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 642 (1971) (quoting Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he
line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords
with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.")).
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embody the principles underlying the First Amendment. 17 This brand of
historical deference gives rise to an interesting question. If courts are
willing to defer to the notions of our founding fathers in this regard, why
are more courts not deferring to the beliefs of the socio-political
philosophers whose. theories influenced the notions of our founding
fathers? Would these thinkers agree with the way our American
judiciary has regulated governmental use of religion that is designed to
create a public culture and national identity?
This Comment will explore the latter of these questions. It will
create a "Supreme Socio-Political Philosophy Court" ("SSPPC") in order
to conduct this inquiry. The SSPPC will be composed of John Stuart
Mill, John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes.18 Since the views of these men
will be confined to their most important socio-political works, the
following is an exhaustive list of the primary texts that will be used:
Utilitarianism19 and On Liberty20  (Mill), Second Treatise of
Government2' and An Essay on Toleration
22 (Locke), and Leviathan23
17. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV.
693, 695 (1976) (implying that the intent of the framers speaks to the purposes of the
Constitution), cited in Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of
State Sovereign Immunity: the Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 439, 525 n.189 (2002).
18. Mill will be the first member of the SSPPC because he articulated a non-
interference principle that mirrors the purposes of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. See Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: on Values,
Valuing, and the Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 285, 286 (2006). This principle
"precludes [governmental intrusion] in those areas of life which only concern individuals
themselves." Id. Locke will be the second member of the SSPPC because his philosophy
was influential in the framing of the Establishment Clause. See Noah Feldman, The
Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 350-51, 369-71
(2002). Hobbes will be the third and final member of the SSPPC because his philosophy
influenced the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses insofar as it illustrated the
drawbacks associated with the commingling of church and state. See Matthew A. Ritter,
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Law and Religion: Privacy v. Pietv--Has the Supreme
Court Petered Out?, 40 CATH. LAW. 323, 372 n.22 (2001).
19. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Prometheus Books 1987) (1863)
[hereinafter MILL, UTILITARIANISM].
20. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in J.S. Mill: On Liberty and
other writings, (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge University Press 2000) (1989) [hereinafter
MILL, LIBERTY].
21. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING
THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1689), reprinted in
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE (David Wootton ed., Penguin Books 1993)
[hereinafter LOCKE, TREATISE].
22. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1876), reprinted in Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed.,
Yale University Press 2003) [hereinafter LOCKE, TOLERATION].
23. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard E. Flathman and David Johnston ed.,
W.W. Norton & Co, Inc. 1997) (1651) [hereinafter HOBBES, LEVIATHAN]; THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Barnes & Noble Publishing, Inc. 2004) (1651) [hereinafter
1074 [Vol. 112:4
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(Hobbes). The theories of these men will be used to analyze
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence in an attempt to discover
whether this jurisprudence is in accord with the philosophies that
influenced the beliefs of our forefathers and their ancestors. The obvious
place to begin such an inquiry is with the exposition of these socio-
political philosophies.
Section II: Philosophical Background
A. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism and On Liberty
In Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill bases morality on the standard of
utility,24 which is illustrated by the Greatest Happiness Principle.25 This
principle states that actions are right to the extent that they produce
happiness and wrong to the extent that they produce unhappiness.26 Mill
posits that pleasure is the only thing desirable as an end; and that all
desirable things are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in
themselves, or as means to producing pleasure.27 Thus, Mill measures
the morality of an action by its ability to produce utility, not by the
motivation stimulating the action. 8
For Mill, there is a relationship between utility and justice. He
claims:
The idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, and a
sentiment which sanctions the rule. The [rule] must be supposed
common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The
[sentiment] is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who
infringe the rule. There is involved, in addition, the conception of
some definite person.. . whose rights are violated by [the
infringement] 29
For Mill, justice is done when rights are observed, and injustice is done
when rights are violated.3 ° Mill believes that preserving rights produces
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN UNABRIDGED].
24. See MILL, UTILITARIANISM, supra note 19, at 12.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 16-17 (explaining that "happiness" means pleasure and the absence of pain,
whereas "unhappiness" refers to pain and the dearth of pleasure).
27. Id. at 17. Mill justifies this by claiming that humans actively pursue utility
because it is rooted in the fundamental human desire for unity. Id. at 45, 50.
28. Id. at 29-30. "Motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action. He who
saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be
duty, or the hope of being paid for the trouble." Id.
29. Id. at 70.
30. See id.
2008] .1075
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utility3 1 and thus, he asserts that it is unjust to deprive someone of their
legal rights if those rights are compatible with utility.
32
Mill claims that justice is primarily concerned with the utility
produced by security. 33  Security is crucial because it provides
"immunity from evil."34 Since the mandates of justice preserve security,
they also preserve peace.35 If the mandates of justice were ignored, there
would be no happiness because everyone would be obsessed with
securing themselves against the aggression of others.36 Paranoia and
chaos would reign supreme and people would be paralyzed by their fear
of others.37 Thus, Mill asserts that the protection of individual rights, and
the security it engenders, is essential for utility and social progress.38
Mill believes that there is only one condition that allows the
government to impinge upon individual rights and liberties.39  This
condition is articulated by the "Harm Principle, 4 ° which states that:
the sole end for which mankind are warranted.., in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over




In practical terms, this passage illustrates Mill's belief that a
31. Id. at 71. It is clear that Mill believes that justice is not based in the enforcement
of laws, which can be fundamentally unjust; rather, justice is found in the enforcement
and protection of rights, which originate in utility. Id.
32. Id. at 60.
33. Id. at 71.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 77.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 77-81.
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id.
41. Mill intended "legal harm" to be defined as a significant material or non-material
misaffection inflicted upon an individual by another individual's failure to perform a
negative duty. Interview with Dr. Christine Sistare, Professor of Law and Morality,
Muhlenberg College, in Allentown, Pa. (Sept. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Sistare Interview].
Mill would consider something "significant" if it obstructed the liberty of action of any
rational adult. FREDERICK SCHAUER & WALTER SINNOTr-ARMSTRONG, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS WITH COMMENTARY 310 (1996).
"Material" indicates that the result of the alleged action is tangible, whereas "non-
material" indicates that the result is intangible. Sistare Interview. A "misaffection"
occurs if an individual endures an event that puts the person in a worse condition then the
condition the person was in prior to experiencing the event. Id. A "negative duty" is a
duty to refrain from something. Id.
42. MILL, LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 19. Self-harm and harm inflicted upon those
consenting to the harm do not fall under the guise of the Harm Principle and therefore do
not justify governmental interference. Id. at 15.
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government can justly levy punishment upon its citizens when they harm
others.43 Thus, Mill reconciles his notion of liberty with his promotion
of utility by indicating that individual liberties should only be protected
to the extent that they are conducive to utility; in other words, individual
liberties must be circumscribed by notions of utility.44 He concludes that
people are not free to harm others because doing so consistently
produces disutility and displeasure.45
Mill asserts that there are three spheres of human liberty.46 These
spheres are the freedom of consciousness, the freedom of self-
determination, and the freedom to assemble so long as that assembly
does not harm others.47 He claims that genuine liberty is the ability to
live one's life as one sees fit, as long as one does not interfere with the
right of others to do the same.48 Mill asserts that the protection of
individual liberty produces social utility because it stimulates social
progress.49
Based on his concept of liberty, Mill provides four justifications
50
for the free expression of opinion.5' First, he claims that the suppression
of individual opinion is detrimental to society because it may deprive
society of the truth.5 2  If the suppressed opinion is actually true, the
suppression prevents society from exchanging error for truth.5 3
Conversely, even if the opinion is wrong, suppression of the opinion
prevents society from gaining a clearer perception of the truth because it
inhibits society from contrasting truth with error. 54 Second, Mill argues
43. Id. at 13.
44. See MILL, LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 13; MILL, UTILITARIANISM, supra note 19,
at 77-81.
45. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. See MILL, LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 15-16.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 15-16. Again, I do not interfere with your rights if you permit me to
violate them. See id. at 76. This caveat in the Harm Principle recognizes the individual
right of self-determination. See id.
49. See MILL, LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 15-22; MILL, UTILITARIANISM, supra note
19, at 77-81.
50. All of these justifications for free expression extend to the free criticism of laws.
See MILL, LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 22. For, although laws are framed to serve general
utility, they may fail to do so. Id. The free exchange of ideas promotes dialogue
concerning these laws so that they can be reformed or repealed if they are genuinely
misguided. Id. Conversely, the suppression of opinions and ideas promotes conformity
to the status quo, and inhibits the repeal of misguided laws. Id. at 64-65.
51. See id. at 20-52.
52. Id. at 20.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 20-22. Promoting the free exchange of ideas allows a multitude of ideas to
enter the intellectual marketplace, where the viability of the ideas will be debated. See id.
Contrasting the "true" ideas with "erroneous" ideas enables people to understand why the
"true" ideas are more viable. See id. If the integrity of the intellectual marketplace is not
10772008]
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that if ideas are not expressed and challenged, the truth will become
"dead dogma."55 People will unquestioningly follow the truth, without
any real understanding of it and therefore, they will not be able to defend
it against criticisms. 56 If people cannot understand what is true, they will
not be able to effectively attain utility because they will not understand
how to pursue it.5 7 Third, Mill maintains that if debate is stifled, the
inherent meaning of the truth may be lost and individual acceptance of
this truth may not be reflected in the actions of individuals. 58 Again,
people will not be able to achieve utility because they will not have any
concept of how to produce or pursue it.59 Fourth and finally, Mill asserts
that debate allows opposing sides to employ checks and balances on each
other. 60 Each adversary provides a mechanism to moderate any potential
radicalism displayed by the opposing side.6' This mechanism aids utility
because it prevents any abuse of power 62 by any of the opposing
63parties. Additionally, this mechanism aids truth seeking, as the truth
often lies somewhere in between the positions espoused by the opposing
parties. 64
Mill concludes his discussion of free expression by claiming that
when expression serves to instigate an unjustly harmful act, the opinion
can be rightfully suppressed.65 To illustrate, Mill provides the following
example:
An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor.., ought to be
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly
incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled
before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed out among the
same mob in the form of a placard.66
Mill echoes a similar sentiment when addressing the extent of freedom of
preserved, there may not be anything against which truth can be contrasted. See id. at 23-
24. In turn, people may lose the ability to accurately and consistently identify and
reaffirm that which is genuinely true. See id. at 21-24. This inhibits the ability of people
to pursue utility and attain social progress. See id.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id. at 37-38.
57. See id. at 37-40.
58. See id. at 40-41.
59. See id. at 37-40.
60. See id. at 47-52.
61. Seeid. at 47.




65. Id. at 56.
66. Id.
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action.67 He claims, "[i]t is essential that human beings should be free to
form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve" as long as
they do not directly or vicariously produce more harm than utility.68 Mill
values the protection of thoughts and actions because it allows humans to
identify more fulfilling ways of living by observing the opinions and
69actions of others. It also allows humans to see the potential advantage
of combining the attributes of different thoughts and opinions.
70
At this point, it is important to note a significant facet of Mill's
theory of liberty: he confines it to adults who are members of civilized
societies. 71 He asserts that liberty can only be possessed by those who
are capable of learning from the symbiotic relationship between
divergent opinions and actions.72 Regarding children, Mill asserts that
parents do not have full ownership over the lives of their children. 73 It is
the duty of society to train children in the doctrine it believes to be
conducive to the accumulation of knowledge because knowledge will
enable children to independently interpret experiences when they become
adults.74 This skill enables mature adults to assess opinions and make
choices among competing opinions rather than blindly accepting the
status quo.75 Cultivating one's beliefs for one's self is an essential aspect
of Mill's theory of liberty, as it is the only means by which society can
the social progress associated with utility.
76
Throughout his works, Mill adheres to the belief that it is only
67. Id. at 56-57. Both freedom of expression and freedom of action are
circumscribed by the Harm Principle. Id. However, actions are more likely to cause
harm than are opinions. See id. at 56. Thus, in application, the Harm Principle restricts
actions to an extent greater than it restricts opinions. See id. Mill himself admits, "No
one pretends that actions [are as] free as opinions." Id. Indeed, opinions that are harmful
in themselves do not violate the Harm Principle. See id. at 56-57. Opinions only violate
the Harm Principle when they induce harmful actions, which in themselves violate the
Harm Principle. See id.
68. See id. at 57.
69. See id. at 64-66.
70. See id. at 71.
71. Id. at 13-14.
72. See id. at 14, 20-24.
73. See id. at 82.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 20-24. Without proper education, dissenting opinions will near
extinction because untrained children will blindly accept the status quo when they reach
adulthood. See id. Consequently, they will not be able to identify and affirm truths
during their adulthood. See id. This will stultify human development, which in turn will
produce social stagnation. See id. Thus, Mill asserts that while the government can
attempt to influence the beliefs of its citizens, it must ultimately respect their individual
decisions, regardless of whether those decisions are the ones the government would like
them to make. Id. at 82. If this were not the case, dissent would be eviscerated and
society would never attain utility or progress. Id. at 20-24.
76. Id. at 15-22.
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through the preservation of divergent opinions that society can attain
progress and utility.7 7 This can only be accomplished in a society where
the government does not restrain the free dissemination of information;
in a society whose government educates its citizens in freely interpreting
the knowledge they have accumulated; and in a society endorsing
individuality, toleration of dissent, and freedom from conformity.
7 8
B. John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government and an Essay
Concerning Toleration
When discussing the socio-political philosophy of John Locke, a
logical starting point is Locke's "state of nature.,, 79 Locke views the
state of nature as a state in which people have
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions
and persons as they see fit, within the bounds of the [L]aw of
[N]ature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any
man. [It is also a state] of equality, wherein all the power and
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.3
°
For Locke, the Law of Nature is universal and obligates everyone to
avoid harming others in their life, 81 health, liberty or possessions.82
Every person in the state of nature has the power to execute natural
laws83 and punish the violation of natural laws to the extent that such
punishment will deter future violations of that law.
84
The state of nature is characterized by "men living together
according to reason, without a common superior... [and] with authority
77. See generally MILL, LIBERTY, supra note 20; MILL, UTILITARIANISM, supra note
19.
78. See sources cited supra note 77.
79. See LOCKE, TREATISE, supra note 21, at 262 (explaining that the state of nature is
the state in which humans naturally find themselves).
80. Id. at 262-63. In the state of nature, every person has the ability to exert
influence over others because equality mandates that anything one person can do, others
must be permitted to do. Id. By performing an act, an individual implicitly consents to
the performance of that act by others. See id. Concordantly, this doctrine of reciprocity
prevents the consolidation of absolute power in any one person. Id.
81. The law of self-preservation is integral to the state of nature, and permits a
person to kill another in self-defense. Id. at 264. This is based on the belief that any
aggression by one person against another constitutes a challenge to that person's liberty.
Id.
82. Id. One can only deprive another of these things if it is in the name of justice,
and justice demands that the punishment fit the crime. Id.
83. In the state of nature, men have "natural liberty," the right to be ruled solely by
the laws of nature. Id. at 272. People have the right to protect themselves upon
incursions of this freedom, as there is no central authority from which to seek protection.
Id.
84. Id. at 264.
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to judge between them., 85 Since men live without a common authority,
there is no external power that prevents them from exerting force upon
others.86 Indeed, such force is often exerted when men compete for the
limited resources available in the state of nature.87 This aggressive
competition ushers in the state of war. 88  Since men have no central
authority from which they can seek remedy for this aggression, they are
entitled to meet the aggression of their assailants with aggression of their
own.89 These oppressive conditions remain present until humans create a
political society by entering into a social compact with each other.9 ° This
compact 9l is often forged by the desire to escape the instability of the
state of war, thereby providing security for one's life and property.92
In coming together for collective security, those who enter into the
social compact relinquish their personal freedom and agree to abide by
the mandates of the majority, which will ostensibly act in the best
interests of society as a whole.93 Secondly, civil society provides three
things that nature lacks: an established law (the province of a
legislature), an objective judge or arbiter (the province of the judiciary),
and the power to execute the laws (the province of the executive).94 As
long as these powers serve the best interests of those assenting to the
social compact, the commonwealth is valid.95 In order to gain these
advantages of a civil society, humans must be willing to relinquish two
treasured liberties associated with the state of nature: the power to
pursue any act not violating the state of nature and the ability to gain
85. Id. at 270.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 270-79.
88. See id. at 269-72. By "war" Locke really means "interpersonal conflict," not the
military conflicts among sovereign nations that contemporary society associates with the
term. See id
89. This principle extends beyond mere physical assaults and includes the use of
lethal force. Id. at 270. "[I may kill a] thief... [when] the law, which was made for my
self-preservation... cannot interpose to secure my life." Id. This situation can occur
when humans are in the state of nature, since they lack a common authority. See id. at
269-72. It can occur in political society when the ineptitude of the government prevents
it from sufficiently resolving interpersonal conflicts. See id.
90. Id. at 309-10 (Humans, being naturally free and equal, are subject to outside
power only insofar as they consent to such subordination. The security in life, liberty, and
estate-all of which Locke refers to as "property"-engendered by the laws of a
commonwealth provide the only reason for relinquishing individual freedom and
submitting one's self to the rules of civil society).
91. Creating a social compact and entering into a political society creates a
"commonwealth," id. at 311, whose power cannot transgress the limits placed upon it by
its creators, id. at 272.
92. Id. at 309-10.
93. Id. at310.
94. Id. at 325.
95. Id. at 387.
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retribution for violations of the natural law.
96
Since civil society is formed at the behest of the people, Locke
asserts that the majority has the power to select its form of government.97
Regardless of form, Locke asserts that the commonwealth cannot be
paternal or conjugal in nature.98 While all people are born with freedom
and reason, they initially lack the capacity to exercise the latter.99 Thus,
paternal power persists until children can exercise their reason in a way
that allows them to function and survive independently. 100  Since
individual liberty and reason are natural rights, society must recognize
these rights when the latter has developed to the point where the
individual can judiciously exercise the former.'0 ' Thus, civil society
cannot be paternalistic in nature because paternalistic societies do not
recognize the liberty associated with a rationale being. 0 2  Conjugal
affiliations must be avoided because they are actualized through either a
master-slave relationship or a parent-child relationship, relationships that
also fail to respect the individual liberties associated with a rationale
adult. 103
In further articulating the characteristics of governmental power,
Locke asserts that it should only extend to civil concerns and should not
encompass the "salvation of souls.' 1 4  Civil concerns include life,
liberty, health, and physical possessions."'' 0 5  The power of the
commonwealth is circumscribed in these ways for the following reasons.
Firstly, Locke maintains that God has never enabled any man to
provide for the salvation of any other. 0 6 Secondly, Locke asserts that the
power of the commonwealth extends only to external force, while
96. See id. at 326. Locke asserts that people in civil society are bound by the laws
created by the majority. See id. Thus, they cannot commit an act that would violate
those laws, even if that act would not violate the laws of nature. See id. The laws in civil
society can be more stringent than those in the state of nature, but they may not violate
the laws of nature. See id. at 324-27. Thus, freedom of action is only partially restricted
by the entrance of humans into civil society, as humans can act freely provided that their
actions do not violate any laws. See id. at 325-26. Conversely, humans completely
forsake the right to punish criminals, as this responsibility will be divided between the
judicial power and the executive power. See id.
97. Id. at 327.
98. See id. at 286-309, 349-35 1.
99. Id. at 291.
100. Id. at 293.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 291-93.
103. Id. at 300.
104. LocKE, TOLERATION, supra note 22, at 218. Conversely, ecclesiastic laws can
only concern themselves with the salvation of souls and the attainment of eternal life;
they cannot relate to civil matters. Id. at 223.
105. Id. at 218.
106. Id. at 219.
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religious beliefs are internal and can only be altered by the willing
consent of an individual.10 7 The latter cannot be altered through external
compulsion, as they are internal affinities.10 8 For Locke, it is impossible
to compel someone to believe a specific religious doctrine because it is
impossible to assess what his inner affinities are.109 One can compel
someone to recite a pledge or a prayer, but that external acquiescence
does not necessarily mean that the person actually believes what he is
professing. 10 The person may merely be placating his coercer so as to
avoid any detrimental sanctions, while truly believing something
antithetical to what they outwardly express. 11' Thus, since salvation
depends upon inward beliefs that are impervious to outward coercion,
Locke concludes that the salvation of souls is not the province of
governmental power because any attempts to coerce religious beliefs
would be futile." 2 Lastly, Locke asserts that governmental power should
only extend to civil concerns because there is only one correct path to
heaven and no one can indisputably identify which path is the correct
path.1 13 Since anyone's guess is as good as everyone else's guess, Locke
asserts that the government should permit individuals to pursue the path
that they believe maximizes their chance to attain eternal salvation
14
Thus, he asserts that personal choices regarding religious beliefs should
receive the respect of all other social beings, including the
government. 15 This rationale forms the foundation for Locke's call to
religious toleration.' 
16
However, Locke asserts that there are limits to such toleration.
Firstly, the Church retains the right to excommunicate any member who
continually violates the tenets of the religion and ignores admonitions
against such actions." 7 Secondly, an individual cannot injure the civil
interests of another individual for religious reasons (i.e. different
religious beliefs). 18 The same holds for churches in their interactions
107. Id. at 219.
108. Id. "For no man can... conform his faith []to the dictates of another. All the
life and power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind;




112. Id. at 220.
113. Id.
114. See id. Because of this, Locke also believes that individuals should be allowed
to alter their beliefs at any time. Id. at 222.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 223.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 224.
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with individuals and other churches. 119 Thirdly, Locke reiterates that
ecclesiastical power is confined to the bounds of the Church and does not
extend to civil interests. 20  Lastly, Locke posits that even though the
state cannot coerce religious beliefs through punishment, it may attempt
to teach and counsel its citizens as to what it believes is the proper path
to righteousness."'
In order to more fully understand the requirements of toleration,
Locke divides religion into two aspects: "the outward form and rights of
worship, and the doctrines and articles of faith." 122 Regarding outward
worship, Locke posits that the state has no power to legally prescribe the
use of certain rituals as a component of religious worship.'23 While
indifferent things 24 may fall under the legislative power of the state,
objects are not classified as such unless they are in the greater good of
the community. 125 Additionally, when indifferent things are incorporated
into religious worship they cease to be "indifferent" and gain a wholly
religious character.
126
Just as the state cannot force a church to transform an indifferent act
into a religious act by incorporating it into religious worship, the state
cannot forbid the use of any religious acts that are traditional components
of worship. 127 This latter assertion is circumscribed by the requirement
that a religious act must be lawful during the ordinary course of life in
order to gain such noninterventionist deference. 1
28
With regard to the interaction between secular laws and religious
worship, Locke asserts that if the purpose of a law is rooted in religious
reasons, the law is invalid. 29 However, if there is a secular purpose
justifying the law, it is valid in spite of any burdens it may impose on
119. Id.
120. Id. at 226 (explaining that the government can punish drunkenness for civil
reasons but not for religious reasons).
121. Id. at 228.
122. Id. at 233.
123. Id.
124. "Indifferent things" are those things that do not inherently serve a religious or
secular purpose, such as washing one's self. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (explaining that when the washing of an infant takes place in a sacred font
during a baptismal ceremony, the specific act of washing loses its "indifferent" character
and assumes an entirely religious character).
127. Id. at 235-36.
128. Id. at 236. For instance, infant sacrifice runs counter to the ordinary course of
life, and therefore would not be permitted in any religious practice. Id.
129. Id. As long as a religious practice does not harm any person in the
commonwealth or the commonwealth itself, that practice must be permitted. Id.
Criminalizing a religious practice on religious grounds is impermissible. Id. Thus, just
as individuals cannot injure religious interests for religious reasons, neither can the state.
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religious worship. 30  In contemporary jurisprudential terms, Locke
would require that the laws possess "formal neutrality" but would not
require "substantive neutrality.'
' 31
These concepts illuminate the extent to which the state can regulate
religion. Since any attempts to coerce beliefs are futile, governmental
regulation of religious beliefs are invalid. 132  Likewise, governmental
regulation of religious activities for the sake of religion is invalid
because doing so would, in essence, be a vicarious regulation of a
religious belief. 33  However, governmental regulations possessing
secular purposes are completely valid regardless of whether they
practically burden religion. 34  It is apparent from this exegesis that
Locke does not issue a plenary condemnation of religious coercion; he
only prohibits it when it is motivated by religious sentiments.
35
It is through this dichotomy that one understands the type of
freedom Locke espouses. Since freedom of action can be curtailed in
certain circumstances, it is not absolute. 36 However, Locke notes that
freedom of belief is never curtailed because individual beliefs reside in a
completely internal realm. 37 For this reason, external forces can never
coerce one into altering one's beliefs. 38 Since one is completely free to
adhere to any beliefs one desires, and since those beliefs cannot be
coerced, Locke insinuates that freedom of belief is absolute. 139  This
conclusion is consistent with Locke's belief that liberty of conscience is
130. Id. at 236. Locke provides us with the following example. If outlawing the
sacrifice of calves was necessary to promote an increase in a decimated cattle population,
the law would possess a secular purpose. Id. Although it would have detrimental effects
on those religions whose rituals included cattle sacrifice, the law would be valid because
it would be motivated by a secular purpose. Id.
131. James R. Beattie, Jr., Taking Liberalism and Religious Liberty Seriously:
Shifting Our Notion of Toleration from Locke to Mill, 43 CATH. LAW. 367, 375 (2004)
(explaining that "formal neutrality" requires that the law's purpose be neutral, where as
"substantive neutrality" requires the law to be neutral as implemented) [hereinafter
Beattie, Liberalism and Religious Liberty].
132. LocKE, TOLERATION, supra note 22, at 229-30.
133. See id. (explaining that the regulation of religious acts for religious reasons
would be tantamount to sanctioning the beliefs underlying those religious acts). Locke
asserts that external coercion is ineffectual in altering the religious beliefs of others. Id.
at 232.
134. See id. at 236. Having a secular purpose permits these laws to achieve validity
because they do not provide an explicit sanction on the beliefs of particular religions. See
id. Rather, any detrimental effects on religion are considered collateral to the
achievement of the secular purpose. See id. at 236-37. A law has a secular purpose and
protects civil interests when it prevents harm or prejudice to the commonwealth or when
it prevents harm or prejudice to the life or property of any other individual. Id. at 236.
135. Id. at 232-36.
136. Id. at 227-37.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 220-37.
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a natural right of all humans. 140
By now, it should be clear that Locke believes the government must
tolerate all religious beliefs, while it is not required to tolerate all
religious actions.141 In addition to the restrictions outlined above, Locke
narrows his conception of religious toleration in the following ways.
Firstly, he states that opinions running contrary to human society are not
to be tolerated.1 42 Accordingly, people, or religious sects, that believe
that a person's superior power over others is a function of that person's
religious beliefs should be met with intolerance. 143 Secondly, a religion
is not to be tolerated if it requires its adherents to deliver themselves into
the service of a temporal being other than the head of their government
because this would be tantamount to giving one's allegiance to a foreign
king. Thirdly, atheism should not be tolerated because "the taking away
of God ... dissolves all."' 44  Finally, Locke asserts that religious
assemblies should be tolerated.'
45
With these maxims in mind, Locke reasserts that the commonwealth
is created through the consent of the people, who entrust it with the tasks
of promoting their interests and easing their concerns. 14 6  If the
commonwealth abuses its power 147 or fails to serve the interests of its
people, the people reserve the right to alter or dissolve it.148 The power
of dissolution enables the citizens to disband the government peacefully
and permits them to resort to violent revolution. 49  The people
140. Id. at 246.
141. See id. at 220-36. Indeed, it would seem as though the state could regulate both
tolerant and intolerant religious actions provided that there is a sincere secular purpose
inspiring such legislation. Beattie, Liberalism and Religious Liberty, supra note 131, at
377.
142. LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 22, at 244.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 246. Additionally, he argues that since atheists do no believe in God,
atheism is not a religion. See id. Therefore, atheists cannot argue for religious toleration.
Id. From this it is clear that Locke assumes religion is inherently theistic. See id.
145. Id. at 247-249. Critics argue against the toleration of religious assemblies by
asserting that they pose inherent threats to the security of the state. See id. at 248.
However, Locke claims that they pose no inherent threat greater than that posed by civil
assemblies. See id. at 248. "The sum of all we drive at is that every man enjoy the same
rights that are granted by others." Id. at 248. Thus, since civil assemblies are tolerated,
Locke argues that religious assemblies should also be tolerated. Id.
146. LOCKE, TREATISE, supra note 21, at 309-10.
147. Locke asserts that an abuse of power by the commonwealth places its people in a
position worse than that of the state of nature. Id. at 337-39.
148. Id. at 369-74.
149. Id. at 376 (The more egregious the governmental abuses, the closer society
becomes to the state of nature. When abuses are slight, citizens will suffer through them
until their next chance to replace the government peacefully-i.e., through elections.
When the abuses become unbearable and when peaceful solutions have been futile or will
not become available for a long period of time, Locke permits the citizens to revolt
against the government. Without such revolt, Locke maintains that society will be thrust
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themselves reserve the right to judge when dissolution or rebellion is
justified. 150 Locke ends his exposition on government by stating, "[t]he
people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the [government]
themselves, or erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new
hands, as they think good."'
15 1
C. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
Thomas Hobbes describes man's natural condition as one in which
there is no common supreme authority; where each man is sovereign
over his own body and does not owe allegiance to any common power. 152
The lack of an overarching authority cultivates fear of all others in the
hearts of every individual. 5 3 The widespread fear of death and bodily
harm creates in every individual an insatiable appetite for power, which
will enable individuals to defend themselves against any and all
assailants. 54 Hobbes asserts that when the appetites of men are fixed
upon this objective, the natural result is war.'
55
During the time men live without a common power to keep them all
in awe, they are in a condition which is called war[], and such war[]
is of every man against every man... in such condition, there is...
continual fear and danger of violent death. [In this state,] the life of
man [is] solitary, poor[], nasty, brutish, and short.
156
Thus, Hobbes believes that the state of nature is a state of war that
pitts every man against every man, which results in the prevelance of
violence and fear. 57  Ultimately, Hobbes asserts that two natural
passions enable people to escape this brutish existence. First, the fear of
death and bodily harm cultivates in every individual the desire to escape
the state of nature; second, reason 158 illuminates the way to freedom and
into a condition worse than that found in the state of nature.).
150. See id. at 387. Typically, rebellion is only justified when it is a last resort. Id. at
376.
151. Id. at 387.
152. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 68-72.
153. Id. at 69. Both the strong and the weak are fearful because even the weak can
kill the strong. See id. at 68-69. This breeds natural equality. Id. at 69.
154. Id. at 69.
155. Id. at 69-70. Like Locke, Hobbes does not refer to war in the sense of a battle
between nations, but in the sense of interpersonal physical conflict. See id.
156. Id. at 70.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 71-72. Hobbes believes that there is "no right [r]eason constituted by
[niature" because human subjectivity taints each individual's perception of reality. Id. at
26. Therefore, individuals in the state of nature define and understand things differently.
Id. at 25-26. This lack of consensus prevents true certainty, and persists until individuals
begin to relate to each other with same language and definitions. Id. at 26. The certainty
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peace.
59
Reason dictates that peace is best fostered through the creation of a
sovereign power that can ratify and enforce laws. 60 This common power
is necessary to combat the ever-present desire to accumulate power.' 61
The sovereign is created when people, through a social contract,
voluntarily agree to live together in a civil society (called a
"commonwealth" or the "leviathan") that prescribes rules of conduct and
punishes violations of these prescriptions. 162 Thus, although the impetus
to create a social contract is the fear associated with the state of nature,1
63
the sovereign himself 164 rules through fear, the fear associated with the
punishment of criminality. 165 Thus, fear is intimately associated with the
dual purpose of the leviathan. First, the leviathan allows people to
escape the carnal fears associated with the state of nature. 66 Second, it
utilizes fear of punishment in order to foster a sense of security and
peace among its constituents. .67 If the sovereign cannot accomplish
these goals, the leviathan dissolves, nullifying the social contract and
thrusting people back into the state of nature. 1
68
In forging the social contract, individuals relinquish their rights and
cede them to the sovereign, only retaining the right of self-
preservation. 69 Thus, the sovereign becomes the entity that provides the
produced through this process promotes reason, which Hobbes asserts is nothing more
than the deduction of principles from the generally agreed upon definitions. Id. Hobbes
believes that once the state of nature forces people to come together and form a common
understanding, they will realize that their physical security depends upon escaping the
state of nature. See id. at 71-72.
159. Id. at 71-72.
160. Id. at 95. In order for the sovereign to effectively protect his citizens, the
citizens must agree to mutually and reciprocally consolidate their power, rights, and will
in him. Id. In ceding their will to the sovereign, the citizens become authors of the
sovereign's actions; therefore, they implicitly consent to those actions. Id.
161. Seeid. at95.
162. Id. at 95.
163. Id. at 71-72.
164. The "sovereign" denotes the ruling entity created by the social contract. While it
can be a single person or a group of people, Hobbes continually refers to it as "he." See
generally id. For the sake of consistency, I will do the same.
165. Id. at 93. The fear associated with the state of nature is unbearable because this
state lacks a common power that can enforce peace and order. See id. at 68-72.
Contrastingly, the sovereign uses fear in order to produce peace and order. See id. at 93-
95. Thus, living with the leviathanic fear is much more preferable than living with the
fear associated with the state of nature because the former produces security. See
generally id. at 68-95.
166. See id. at 93-95.
167. See id. at 95.
168. Seeid. at 169.
169. See id. at 95. Since self-preservation is the impetus for entering civil society, id.,
the sovereign cannot demand that individuals jeopardize their life or cause harm to
themselves or others, id. at 120. Thus, valid claims of self-preservation are the only
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shared meanings and definitions that allow people to peacefully
communicate with each other.170 In addition to commanding loyalty and
obedience from its constituents, the sovereign also possesses legislative
and judicial powers. 17' He may determine what ideas are acceptable and
may censor those that are deemed to threaten peace and order.
72
Subjects owe him loyalty and cannot be exculpated from this
obligation. 73 In return for this obedience, the sovereign is proscribed
from injuring any innocent subject. 1
74
Hobbes notes that individuals gain absolute liberty by entering civil
society, even though they relinquish their rights to the sovereign in so
doing. 175  "Liberty" is the ability to act as one pleases without
encountering encumbrances in executing that act. 176 Hobbes claims that
liberty did not exist in the state of nature because actions were inhibited
by fear. 177 However, while fear is still present in civil society, Hobbes
asserts that this fear does not nullify freedom because individuals
vicariously consent to it through their formation of the leviathan,
78
which uses that fear to protect them.
79
In addition to playing a key role in the departure from the state of
nature, reason also enables humans to discern "laws of nature," which
are innate truths that are perceptible through natural mental faculties.1
8
0
The First Law of Nature states, "every man, ought to [pursue] peace ...
and when he cannot obtain it ... he may ... use, all the helps and
advantages of war[]. The first branch of [this] rule ... is to seek [p]eace.
legitimate reasons for disobeying the laws of civil society. Id.
170. Id. at 99 (insinuating that competing ideas produce social discord and violence).
171. Id. at 99-100.
172. Id. at 99.
173. Id. at 98.
174. See id. at 100.
175. See supra note 160 (insinuating that men in civil society retain liberty because
they, as authors of the sovereign's actions, consent to the restraints placed upon them by
the sovereign).
176.. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 115.
177. See id. at 68-72. Individuals in the state of nature have no common authority
that preserves order and thus, individuals live in a constant state of fear. See id. at 70-71.
Individuals do not consent to this fear; it is their natural condition about which they can
do nothing. See id. at 68-70. Ergo, in the state of nature, although individuals
theoretically possess the freedom to do as they please, this theoretical freedom is
effectively limited by fear to which they do not consent. See id. This is why humans
lack true freedom in the state of nature. See id. Although actions in the commonwealth
are also limited by fear (fear of punishment), humans have freedom in the commonwealth
because they consent to the sovereign's use of fear. See supra note 160.
178. See note 160 (insinuating that citizens consent to the fear employed by the
sovereign because they are authors of his acts).
179.. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 116.
180. Id. at 72.
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The [s]econd is ... to defend ourselves [at all costs]."'18 1 Thus, Hobbes
maintains that natural law mandates the attainment of peace because it
exercises one's natural right of self-preservation.' 
82
The Second Law of Nature mandates that individuals must mutually
divest themselves of certain rights if they are to avoid war and live
together amicably. 83 This principle of reciprocity emanates from the
right of self preservation. Since people are constantly concerned with
their physical well-being and self-preservation, they would loathe
relinquishing rights that others retain because doing so would give others
a competitive advantage. Other natural laws relevant to the present
inquiry are as follows: the Fifth Law of Nature asserts that individuals
should attempt to accommodate others when their differences revolve
around minor issues; 184 and the Tenth Law of Nature reaffirms
reciprocity, stating that people should retain only those rights which they
are willing to recognize in others.'85 For Hobbes, the nineteen laws of
nature comprise the foundation upon which morality is to be judged. 186
While enforcement of the laws of nature is not contingent upon the
publication of those laws, the enforcement of civil 87 laws is dependent
upon publication. 88 The sovereign, or any judge appointed by him, may
pardon the violation of a law if there is reasonable ignorance of the law;
however, ignorance is no excuse when the law reasonably should have
been known. 189 Transgression of both civil and natural laws may be
excused when the transgressor lacks reason (by virtue of a condition of
minority, mental ailments, or retardation).' 90 When a reasonable person
violates a law of which he or she should have been aware, the sovereign
is justified in punishing the individual. 19 Additionally, it is important to
note that the sovereign himself lies outside the law that he creates and
cannot therefore be punished through it for any reason.
92
While such a status means that violations of the law by the
sovereign will not send the commonwealth into civil war, Hobbes does
enumerate several conditions that would dissolve the leviathan, thereby
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 72-73.
184. Id. at 83-84.
185. Id. at 85.
186. Id. at 86-87.
187. Civil laws are those laws ratified through any manifestation of the will of the
sovereign. Id. at 132-33.
188. Id. at 135-36.
189. Id. at 137.
190. Id. at 136.
191. Id. at 134, 156.
192. Id. at 133.
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thrusting society into the state of nature.' 93 The conditions relevant to
the present inquiry include: when the goodness of actions is determined
by individuals instead of by the sovereign; 194 when individuals believe
that their duty to the commonwealth is subordinate to their
consciences; 95 and when individuals place their ultimate faith in
supernatural phenomena instead of in the sovereign.' 96 In order to avoid
the state of nature that is ushered in through these conditions, citizens
must obey the sovereign in all aspects of governance which assist him in
preserving and maintaining peace and security.'
97
An interesting conflict arises when civil laws conflict with religious
laws. 198 Hobbes resolves this tension by molding Christianity so that it
fits into his philosophical system.199 Hobbes claims that the Kingdom of
God is not found in this world because God is not imminently present in
this world; therefore, the sovereign is the supreme ruler of the temporal
world.200  Accordingly, the sovereign must not only serve as head of
state, but also as head of religion. 0' Hobbes bases his assertion on the
belief that the creation of peace and harmony rests on the ability of the
sovereign to establish common dialogue and binding laws,20 2 an
objective frustrated by dividing civil and ecclesiastical power between
two entities.20 3
Although Hobbes vests ecclesiastic and civil authority in the
sovereign, he recognizes that social tension could occur if the sovereign
ratifies laws that ostensibly contradict religious beliefs.20 4 In such a
situation, the people must obey the leviathanic dictates because
disobedience would challenge the authority of the sovereign, thereby
193. See id. at 162-69.
194. Id. at 162.
195. Id. at 163-64.
196. Id. at 164.
197. Id. at 121-22 (When the sovereign fails to preserve peace and order, citizens are
no longer bound to the rules established by the sovereign. This causes society to revert to
the state of nature.).
198. In mentioning religious laws, Hobbes only considers Christian tenets, insinuating
that he believes that Christianity is the only valid religion in the Leviathan. See generally
id. at 180-252.
199. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN UNABRIDGED, supra note 23, at 366-67.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 367.
202. Id.
203. Id. (explaining that vesting ecclesiastic and civil power in different authorities
frustrates peace because it creates confusion as to which authority figure is supreme).
Challenges to the power of the sovereign lead to civil war, which thrusts individuals into
the state of nature. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 120. This violates natural law
because it jeopardizes security. See id. at 72. Hobbes firmly believes that peace and
security are preserved by allowing the sovereign, and the sovereign alone, to proclaim the
laws. See id. at 99.
204. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN UNABRIDGED, supra note 23, at 455-56.
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jeopardizing security.205 Thus, Hobbes requires individuals to obey the
sovereign in all things, even if doing so contradicts personal religious
beliefs.2 °6
A sovereign that commands disobedience to Christianity becomes a
member of the "Kingdom of Darkness," a "[c]onfederacy of [d]eceivers,
that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavor.., to
dis-prepare them for the Kingdom[] of God., 20 7 Hobbes claims that there
are four causes of the Kingdom of Darkness: errors resulting from
misinterpretation of the Bible; the belief that the Kingdom of God can be
established in this world; the belief that the Pope is the vicar or Christ;
and the belief that the clergy possess privileged knowledge of God's will
and can invoke God's presence through incantation-i.e., consecrations,
baptisms, and the transubstantiation 20 8 of the Eucharist. 20 9  Hobbes
claims that religious clergy are the source of these maladies because they
derive personal benefit from professing an understanding of and control
210over the divine.
For Hobbes, disavowing the chimerical teachings of modem
Christianity is an essential aspect of preserving civil society because
these teachings present challenges to the authority of the sovereign,
which jeopardizes his ability to eliminate discord and unite the people
under common understandings of nature, religion, and the law. Such
challenges ultimately lead to civil war, which thrusts people into the
brutish state of nature that they so desperately long to escape.
212
According to Hobbes, adopting his philosophical construct is the only
way to avoid such consequences and ensure that each embodiment of
205. Id. at 455 (explaining that Christians do not sin as long as they subjectively
recognize that what they are compelled to profess is not the Word of God and is not
ultimate truth).
206. See id. For Hobbes, religious salvation is not based upon actions, but on inner
convictions because the former does not necessarily reflect the latter. See id. Since the
true realm of religion is internal, Hobbes believes that individuals disobey God and
jeopardize their eternal salvation only when they abandon their inner faith. See id.
207. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 215.
208. "Transubstantiation" is the "transformation of bread and wine into the body and
blood of Christ during Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox masses." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1252 (10th ed. 2001) [hereinafter MERRIAM-
WEBSTER].
209. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN UNABRIDGED, supra note 23, at 481-83 (explaining that
these acts are symbolic because humans cannot command God's presence in this world).
210. See generally id. at 541-50. This type of boasting attracts people, who
eventually renounce the authority of the sovereign in favor of the authority wielded by
the clergy member. Id. Obviously, this threatens the vitality of society because it inhibits
the ability of the sovereign to command and preserve peace and order. Id.
211. See generally id. at 476-540.
212. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 120.
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civil society will not continually degenerate into the state of nature.
2t 3
This concludes the exposition of the socio-political philosophies
that will be utilized in the present Comment. Focus can now be shifted
towards the application of these philosophies to American case law.
Section III: Case Law and Analysis
In the present section, the socio-political ideals of Mill, Locke, and
Hobbes will be applied to contemporary First Amendment case law in
order to determine whether these thinkers would agree with American
jurisprudence regarding governmental attempts to use religion in creating
a public culture or national identity. Since public education is one of the
main vehicles through which the government controls public culture,
2 14
the present analysis of American case law will focus on jurisprudence in
this area. More specifically, because recitation of pledges and prayers in
public schools remains controversial,2t 5 the present inquiry will examine
jurisprudence involving these two issues.
For each issue, a summary of a relevant Supreme Court decision
will be followed by an analysis of that decision through the eyes of the
three socio-political philosophers. Each philosophical analysis will
implicitly agree or disagree with the majority opinion of the United
States Supreme Court. The conglomeration of the individual decisions
will illustrate whether the SSPPC would agree with the limits that the
Supreme Court has placed on the governmental attempts to use religion
to create a public culture.
A. Compelled Pledge Recitations, Board of Education v. Barnette
216
1. Summary
On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education enacted
213. See generally HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23.
214. Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing
Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1242 n.220 (2002) (citing Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 189 (1992)).
215. James E. Pfander, Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs, 24
LAW & INEQ. 47, 76 (2006) (citing Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After
Santa Fe Independent School District, 90 Ky. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) ("Religion in public
schools has long been a subject of intense controversy in our country and from all
appearances will remain so for a long time to come. Among the various ways that
religion might interject itself in schools, there is none more volatile than the issue of
school prayer."); Charles J. Russo, The Supreme Court and Pledge of Allegiance: Does
God Still Have a Place in American Schools?, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 301 (2004)
(asserting that the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools remains
controversial)).
216. Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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a resolution ["mandatory pledge resolution" or "pledge resolution"]
proclaiming that a salute to the American flag would become "a regular
part of the program of activities in the public schools," that all teachers
and students "shall be required to participate in the salute honoring [our]
Nation, [and that] refusal... [shall] be regarded as an [a]ct of
insubordination ... [to be] dealt with accordingly. 217 Barnette appealed
to the Supreme Court praying for an injunction that would inhibit the
enforcement of the resolution against nonconforming Jehovah's
Witnesses ["Jehovah's"]. 218  One of the basic Jehovah beliefs is that
divine laws established by God are superior to the secular laws created
by government.219 The Jehovah's also believe in a literal interpretation
of the following Biblical passage: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any
graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that
is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt
not bow down thyself to them or serve them., 220 For the Jehovah's, the
American flag constituted such an "image. 221
The Court noted that while "the compulsory flag salute and pledge
requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind,, 222 it was unclear
whether the resolution required the students to believe the content of the
pledge, or whether mechanical recitation without conviction would
suffice.223 Regardless, the Court noted that censorship of expression "is
tolerated... only when the expression presents a clear and present
danger of action of a kind the State is empowered 'to prevent and
punish., 224 Since compelling action is a more severe limitation on free
speech than is mere censorship, the Court reasoned that the former would
require a more immediate threat than the threat justifying the latter. 5
The Court then revisited precedent by considering one of its
previous cases, Minersville v. Gobitis.226 In Gobitis, the Supreme Court
had held that threats to national unity and national security qualified as
the type of threats which the government could justly prevent and
punish.227 In Barnette, the Court recognized that the governmental right
217. Id. at 626. Insubordination was met with expulsion, during which time the child
was considered "delinquent" and the parents of the child could be prosecuted
accordingly. Id. at 629. If convicted, the parents would face a fine not exceeding $50
and a jail term of no more than thirty days. Id.
218. Id. at 629.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Exodus, 20:4-5).
221. Id.




226. Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
227. Id. (upholding the requirement that students salute the American flag against the
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to promote national unity and security was not in question; rather, it
noted that the real issue was whether compulsion was a constitutional
means of producing this unity and security.228 The Court also noted that
racism and authoritarianism have often been promoted under the guise of
''national unity" or have been produced by ostensibly benign attempts at
promoting "national unity. '229 Attempts to create national unity often
promote conflict, as different groups with different agendas compete to
become the group whose beliefs form the basis of that unity.230  The
Court asserted that the greatest national division would result from
finding it necessary to choose a specific dogma with which American
youth would be indoctrinated. 231  "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official ... can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in... religion., 232  Thus, the Court held that the
compulsory flag salute was unconstitutional, thereby overturning Gobitis
and granting the requested injunction.233
2. Analysis: John Stuart Mill
At first blush, it may appear that Mill would dissent from the
opinion of the majority. After all, he believes that it is the duty of
society to train children so that they cultivate the ability to discern for
themselves the best way of living.234 In doing this, the government is
permitted to inculcate children with the beliefs that it thinks are most
conducive to utility. 235 Proponents of the pledge resolution could argue
that the resolution is an example of the governmental implementation of
this power. Furthermore, since Mill believes that the expression of
opinions can only be suppressed if they instigate unjust harm,23 6 pledge
proponents could argue that nonconformists should be punished because
their insubordination produces an unjust harm; namely, it threatens
national security by jeopardizing national unity. 237 Since security is the
challenge of two Jehovah families). The Court held that threats to national unity
implicitly threaten national security. See id.
228. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
229. Id. "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity
of the graveyard." Id. at 641.
230. Id. at 641.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 642.
233. Id. at 641-42.
234. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
237. Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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type of utility with which individuals are primarily concerned,238
jeopardizing security would have a detrimental effect on the production
and attainment of utility.23 9 People would become paralyzed by the fear
of bodily harm. 240 This preoccupation would stymie social development,
as people would lose the ability to discern and pursue that course of
action producing the most utility.
241
Alternatively, proponents of the mandatory pledge resolution could
justify their position by alleging that the nullification of the pledge
produces disutility. They could assert that while exempting the
Jehovah's may not threaten national security or national unity, it does
instigate unjust harm in the sense that it produces divisiveness in the
classroom. 242 Such divisiveness, and the tension associated with it,
would produce a classroom setting that would not be conducive to
education. Children would lose their opportunity to fully learn how to
make decisions for themselves, which would negatively affect their
ability to identify and pursue conduct conducive to utility.243  Thus,
children certainly would suffer a "material misaffection.' ,244 Since the
children would not learn how to effectively exercise their individual
liberty, the misaffection would also be considered "significant*
' 245
Lastly, the misaffection would result from the failure to perform a
negative duty, the governmental failure to refrain from jeopardizing
246utility and security. 46 This significant material misaffection would
unjustly deprive the government of its right to inculcate children as to the
conduct most conducive to utility. Thus, pursuant to Mill's Harm
Principle, the proponents of the mandatory pledge resolution could
justify their position by arguing that exempting dissenters would inflict
unjust harm upon the students.
238. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
242. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Establishment Clause prevents government from supporting or
advancing religion, a prohibition that reduces the divisiveness that often accompanies
religious differences). The divisive nature of religious matters could manifest itself when
the children, who lack reason and may not have been educated as to the correct way to
treat those who do not ascribe to their belief system, realize that some of their classmates
do not share the same beliefs. Religious sides could be drawn and tension could mount,
causing a decrease in utility.
243. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 41 (defining a "misaffection" as an event that puts the person in a
worse condition then the condition the person was in prior to experiencing the event).
245. See supra note 41 (defining a misaffection as "significant" if it obstructs a
rationale adult's freedom of action).
246. See supra note 41 (defining a "negative duty" as a duty to refrain from
something).
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While these arguments may seem persuasive at first blush, a closer
examination of Mill's philosophy reveals that these positions are
untenable. Any assertion that permitting abstention instigates an unjustly
harmful act 247 is unwarranted. Firstly, in terms of suppressing the
expression of an idea when that expression instigates unjust harm, Mill
asserts:
An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor.. . ought to be
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly
incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled
before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed out among the
same mob in the form of a placard.
248
Unlike this example where the idea was expressed in a volatile context
likely to incite harm, the expression of the Jehovah's occurred in the
context of a classroom where the majority of the students did not share
their beliefs. 249 This minority status made it unlikely that the expression
of their minority ideas would incite anti-American demonstrations or
threaten national security. Such expression was not delivered to
terrorists or expatriates; it was delivered to school aged children who,
through their pledge of allegiance, displayed affection for the United
States. 250  This would seem to cast doubt upon the assertion that
permitting the Jehovah's to refrain from the pledge could decrease
national unity or security.
. While Mill would acknowledge the governmental right to train
children in developing the ability to discern the best way of living, he
would claim that the government must respect personal life decisions
because individual choices preserve dissent.25 1  The preservation of
dissent is important because it produces the social debate that is
conducive to utility and social progress.252 With regard to the issue in
Barnette, pledge opponents would assert that the government exercised
its right when it attempted to inculcate the children by implementing the
pledge resolution. However, he would note that the inculcation failed to
garner the assent of all the children, as the Jehovah's made the choice to
follow their own religious beliefs. According to pledge opponents, the
government should respect this decision because coercing the complicity
of the Jehovah's would deprive society of a dissenting opinion, therefore
decreasing utility and preventing social progress.
247. The harmful act would be the threat that abstention poses to national security.
248. MILL, LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 56.
249. See Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-30 (1943).
250. See id.
251. See supra note 75.
252. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, opponents of the pledge resolution would assert that
the opinion of the pledge proponents253 could be justly suppressed
because it inflicts harm.254 The pledge resolution would certainly inflict
"misaffections" upon dissenting Jehovah's because it would prevent
them from attending classes, an act that would jeopardize their education.
The tangible nature of this injury would qualify it as a "material
misaffection." It would also be "significant" because it would prevent
liberty of action in two ways. It would prevent dissenters from living
their lives as they see fit, and it would prevent them from attending
school. All this would result from the failure of the government to
perform its negative duty to refrain from interfering in the ability of
people to direct their own way of life. Thus, the pledge opponents would
assert that the opinion expressed in the pledge resolution certainly
produces harm. They would contend that this harm is "unjust" because it
results in the deprivation of a right 255 that is compatible with utility.
256
Therefore, they would conclude that the opinion expressed in the pledge
resolution inflicts unjust harm upon dissenters and can therefore be
summarily suppressed.
Since both the pledge proponents and pledge opponents argue that
their theory produces utility, Mill would assert that the utility produced
by reaffirming the pledge resolution must be balanced against the utility
produced from nullifying the resolution. 7  Mill would ultimately
condone the course of action that produces the most utility. 258 Upholding
the pledge resolution produces utility either through the creation and
preservation of national unity and security or through the creation of a
nurturing educational environment; however, it also produces disutility
253. The opinion justifying punishment of the Jehovah's on the basis of national unity
and security.
254. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining that opinions may be
suppressed when they inflict harm upon others who do not consent to sustaining that
harm).
255. People have the right to direct their own way of life provided that they do not
interfere with the ability of others to do the same. See supra note 48 and accompanying
text. Here, the Jehovah's merely ask for an injunction preventing the enforcement of the
pledge resolution. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943). While this would
permit them to pursue their life in their own way, it would not prevent others from
pursuing their lives in their own way. See id. at 626-29. Others could still pledge
allegiance to the flag if they so chose. See id.
256. See supra notes 48, 55-59 and accompanying text (explaining that social
progress and utility are based on the dissenting opinions that are produced by recognizing
each individual's right to lead their life as he or she sees fit).
257. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (insinuating that the utility produced
from pursuing action "x" must be weighed against the utility produced from refraining
from action "x" in order to determine whether or not the action should be taken).
258. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (indicating that utility is the only
legitimate goal of human actions).
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through the suppression of the dissenting opinions espoused by the
Jehovah's. Conversely, the nullification of the mandatory pledge
resolution produces utility through the recognition and protection of
dissenting viewpoints; however, it produces disutility in the sense that it
either jeopardizes national unity and security, or it jeopardizes the
educational environment of students.
When balancing the pros and cons of these actions, a striking
feature becomes apparent. Upholding the mandatory pledge resolution
guarantees disutility because it ensures the suppression of the dissenting
opinions held by the Jehovah's. Conversely, it does not guarantee utility,
as the mechanical recitation of the pledge will not necessarily infuse the
students with patriotism or love for America. 259 Nor will it necessarily
eliminate the disruptive classroom tension produced through the
expression of dissenting opinions.260
On the other hand, the nullification of the mandatory pledge
resolution guarantees utility, as it ensures the free expression and
protection of dissenting opinions. Conversely, it does not necessarily
produce disutility because the exemption for the dissenting Jehovah's is
unlikely to threaten national security or unity. Additionally, the
ostensible disutility emanating from an unstable educational environment
can be preempted by simultaneously teaching children how to civilly
interact with others who do not share similar viewpoints. After all, Mill
believes that society should be a place where people can freely espouse
their beliefs without fear of negative repercussions, and a place where
people tolerate differences and learn from those differences.261
Since utility is assured through the nullification of the mandatory
pledge resolution but is not assured through the enforcement of the
resolution, Mill would support the nullification of the resolution.
3. Analysis: John Locke
Having failed to persuade Mill, proponents of the mandatory pledge
resolution would turn to Locke, where they would justify their position
through the familiar assertion that the state has a right to counsel its
259. And it may not increase national security, as dissenters may simply view the
mandatory pledge requirement as an inflammatory act of pomposity and self-
righteousness on the part of America. In this sense, the pledge requirement may actually
spark anti-American sentiments, which would ultimately serve to jeopardize national
security instead of enhancing it.
260. After all, dissenters may acquiesce to the pledge requirement but may express
their displeasure with it at other times or through other mediums. This could produce the
classroom tension that supposedly disrupts the educational environment enabling students
to identify and pursue the course of action producing the most utility.
261. See generally MILL, LIBERTY, supra note 20.
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citizens as to the proper path(s) to righteousness.262 The punishment of
those who do not abide by the resolution could be justified by asserting
that there is a secular reason263 for such a policy. While Locke condemns
the regulation of religious activities for religious purposes, he permits the
regulation of religious activities when the regulation is incident to laws
bearing a secular purpose. 264 Thus, while the mandatory pledge policy
may in fact impose a burden on religious activities (the ability to refrain
from committing idolatry), this burden is permissible because it is
incident to the secular goal of promoting national utility and security.
Acquiescing to the demands of the pledge opponents would make
governmental authority hostage to the scruples of religious sects. The
nullification of the pledge resolution would be an acknowledgement of
the power that the Jehovah's held over the government,265 a concession
that Locke would never make.266 In jurisprudential terms, the resolution
achieves "formal neutrality" but fails to achieve "substantive neutrality,"
a condition to which Locke does not object.267
Additionally, proponents of the pledge resolution may assert that the
resolution does not fail to tolerate the beliefs of the Jehovah's; it merely
refuses to permit certain manifestations of those beliefs. After all, the
resolution does not generally prohibit the Jehovah's from attending
school, nor does it prohibit the general expression or discussion of
Jehovah beliefs; 268 it merely prohibits the expression of those beliefs in a
262. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Pledge proponents could argue that
the pledge resolution is a byproduct of the exercise of this right.
263. The pledge proponents would argue that the secular purpose of the pledge is to
promote national unity and security, which is the goal of the First Law of Nature.
Although pledge opponents may argue that the resolution is invalid because it punishes
children, see supra note 190 and accompanying text (providing for exculpation from
punishment when the culprit lacks reason), the pledge proponents would use national
unity and security to challenge this assertion. The proponents would note that Hobbes
allows for the exculpation of children, he does not mandate it. See supra note 190 and
accompanying text. Thus, the proponents would claim that the threat to national unity
and security outweighs the condition of minority, allowing for the punishment levied
upon the children pursuant to their violation of the pledge resolution.
264. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
265. More generally, it would recognize the superior power of religious groups to
shape secular laws. In legislating, the government would have to be careful not to
trample on the toes of any religious sect because that sect could use its religious tenets to
successfully challenge secularly motivated laws in order to induce conformity with its
tenets. This would lead to governmental impotency, as the government would lose its
ability to provide its citizens with law and order.
266. See supra note 104 (Since Locke expressly criticizes the extension of ecclesiastic
power into the secular realm he would condemn the nullification of the prayer resolution
because it would amount to an acknowledgement of the Jehovah's power over civil
interests).
267. See Beattie, Liberalism and Religious Liberty, supra note 131, at 375.
268. See Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-30 (1943).
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269
certain way. 6 In their Lockean appeal, pledge proponents would again
claim that the mandatory pledge resolution is not objectionable because
freedom of action may be curtailed for secular purposes.
Opponents of the pledge resolution may respond by claiming that
the policy is paternalistic, 270 a characteristic that Locke criticizes.
27 1
After all, inhibiting individual actions to protect individuals from harm
whose potential they may not appreciate appears to satisfy the
definition.2 72 Secondly, they could assert that the state cannot justly
forbid the use of a religious act that is already employed by a specific
religious sect.273 In this case, it could be argued that refraining from
conduct constituting idolatry constitutes the said "act." Pledge
opponents would argue that since this is a major aspect of Jehovah
worship, the state cannot force the Jehovah's to eliminate it from their
worship.
If the "act" in question was determined not to be that of committing
idolatry but that of reciting the pledge, the opponents of the pledge
resolution could still proffer an argument. They could assert that when
an indifferent act becomes associated with a particular manifestation of
religious worship, it acquires a religious meaning, nullifying its
previously indifferent character. 274  The Jehovah's associate the
allegiance to secular entities as a form of religious worship that they
view as sinful.275 Accordingly, opponents of the mandatory pledge
resolution would claim that the recitation of the pledge is not an
indifferent act for the Jehovah's; therefore, they should not be forced to
interpret it as such. Since the recitation of the pledge is an act of worship
for the Jehovah's, and since the government cannot force religions to
subsume foreign things into their worship,2 76 opponents of the pledge
resolution would assert that the government cannot force the Jehovah's
to recite the pledge.
Finally, opponents of the pledge resolution could challenge the
proponent's assertion that the resolution was enacted for the secular
purpose of promoting national unity and security. The pledge opponents
269. See id.
270. "Paternalism" is defined as the governmental practice of "taking responsibility
for the individual affairs of its citizens, especially by supplying their needs or regulating
their conduct." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1163 (8th ed. 2004).
271. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
272. Compare supra note 270 and accompanying text with supra notes 217, 227 and
accompanying text (indicating that forcing the Jehovah's to recite the pledge for reasons
of national security results in the government taking responsibility for individual affairs
by regulating individual conduct).
273. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
275. Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
276. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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could assert that the mandatory pledge resolution will not promote a
feeling of national unity because compulsion of belief is impossible.277
Simply forcing people to stand and recite the pledge will not change their
inner feelings towards the nation. Thus, the imposition of the pledge
resolution will not increase national security. In fact, it may threaten
national security because the compulsion of American youth may incite
tensions and violence that may fragment national unity and decrease
domestic and foreign support for the American government. Opponents
of the resolution would assert that justifying the pledge resolution on
grounds of national security is merely a guise that cloaks its motivation,
the regulation of an unappealing religious belief. They would claim that
such a purpose cannot motivate government regulations.278
While there are persuasive arguments on both sides of the pledge
debate, Locke would ultimately find more compelling those arguments
offered by the proponents of the pledge resolution. He would discount
the allegation that the desire to promote national unity and security is
inherently paternalistic by asserting that paternalism, at its core, involves
the exercise of parental power over children when the reasoning of the
latter is not developed enough to recognize the restrictions that the law
places on their liberty.2 79 Thus, in paternalistic relationships, there is a
dominant party (father and/or mother) and a subordinate party (child).28°
According to Locke, since the subordinate party lacks the reasoning to
understand the law and the repercussions of failing to abide by it, that
party also lacks the will to make decisions regarding the appropriate way
to act.28' Thus, the paternalistic power prescribes actions by which the
subordinate party must abide until the latter party sufficiently develops
28its reason. 82 This prescription is given regardless of whether the party
agrees with it.
283
This framework runs counter to civil power, which involves
subjects (the citizens) delegating mandates to the authority figure (the
government).284 Citizens do so with a reasoned understanding of the
mandates and their repercussions, and with the will to act in accordance
with those mandates.285 In this scheme, the majority directs the course of
the governmental action and willfully consents to its edicts in exchange
277. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
284. See LOCKE, TREATISE, supra note 21, at 324.
285. See id.
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for the protection of property.286 Thus, the differences between paternal
and civil authority are stark. Under paternalistic power, the subordinate
party cannot reason properly and therefore cannot create the rules or
consent to them.287 On the other hand, under civil power, the people can
utilize reason properly and therefore have the ability to create the rules
and consent to them.288
Locke would assert that the situation in Barnette is more akin to
civil power. People create a society for the protection of their lives and
property. 289 The people cede these interests to the government, which is
charged with promoting and securing them.290 Thus, the people are said
to consent to governmental acts which aim to obtain these objectives.291
The mandatory pledge resolution is an attempt to achieve these
objectives because it promotes national security. If the pledge resolution
was recanted, national unity and national security could dwindle, making
individual lives and property susceptible to foreign invasion or domestic
insurgency. Thus, since the pledge resolution serves the interests which
individuals entrust to the government, the citizens are said to consent to
the resolution. Therefore, Locke would conclude that the pledge
resolution is a manifestation of civil power, not paternalistic power.
Secondly, the opponents of the pledge resolution could assert that
the resolution should be retracted because it impermissibly forbids the
use of a traditional religious act-refraining from idolatry-employed by
the Jehovah's. 292 However, Locke would claim that this assertion is a
mischaracterization of his philosophy. Locke does not believe that the
state cannot forbid the use of any religious act committed by a religious
sect; he states that such a prohibition only extends to acts that are used in
the context of religious worship. 293 In making this assertion, he most
likely confines the phrase "acts involved in religious worship" to
affirmative acts. Otherwise, everything could be denoted as a "religious
act., 294  If this were the case, no act could be regulated by the
government, and the provision restricting governmental regulation to
"acts involved in religious worship" would be frivolous.295
286. See id. at 309-10, 324.
287. See supra notes 100-0 1 and accompanying text.
288. See LOCKE, TREATISE, supra note 21, at 324.
289. See supra note 90.
290. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
294. If the phrase included both affirmative acts (such as reciting a prayer) as well as
acts that were omitted from worship (refraining from worshipping "false gods"), the
prohibition against government regulation would extend to all acts, as all acts could either
be characterized as an act used in worship or an act omitted from worship.
295. Essentially, the rule would swallow itself.
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Since the prohibition on the governmental regulation of acts
involved in religious worship extends only to those acts which are
affirmatively used in worship,296 it cannot extend to the "act" that the
Jehovah's seek to protect, the act of refraining from idolatry. Thus, this
argument against the pledge resolution is not colorable.
Likewise, Locke would also contest the argument that includes as
its premise the assertion that the pledge is a religious article. The pledge
opponents reason that because the pledge is a religious article, the
recitation of the pledge is a form of religious worship. Thus, forcing the
Jehovah's to recite it would be tantamount to forcing them to incorporate
a nontraditional article into their religious worship. The pledge
opponents argue that this is impermissible because the government is
proscribed from forcing religions to subsume foreign objects or acts into
their religious worship.
Locke would challenge this argument by asserting that the pledge is
not a religious act because its purpose is secular.297 Thus, one does not
engage in religious worship through recitation of the pledge, meaning
that the pledge resolution does not force the Jehovah's to subsume
foreign acts into their religious worship.298 Pledge opponents could
counter this assertion by claiming that the "religion" incorporating the
pledge into its worship is the religion of "nationalism." Locke would
challenge this proposition by asserting that if nationalism was considered
a religion, anything done to promote national interests would be
invalidated when it negatively affected another religion. This would
severely hamper the governmental ability to promote national security.
299
While Locke would counter and discredit the arguments of the
296. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
297. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 524 U.S. 1,6 (2004) (asserting that the
purpose of the Pledge of Allegiance is to serve as a symbol of our country and the values
contained therein).
298. Stated differently, the resolution does not force the Jehovah's to subsume foreign
acts into their religious worship because they are not worshipping when they recite the
pledge since the pledge is not a religious act.
299. "Nationalism" is defined as "loyalty and devotion to a nation.., placing primary
emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests." MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 208,
at 771. Since national security surely falls under the auspice of national interests, any
attempt to promote national security could be seen as an act motivated by a religious
purpose. Since laws with religious purposes cannot impose upon the religious worship of
any sect, laws motivated by nationalism would be invalidated if they burdened any
religious worship. Thus, governmental attempts to promote national security would have
to be tailored around the religious worship of all religious groups. This would severely
inhibit the ability of the government to effectively promote national security. As a result,
individual lives and individual property would be jeopardized, a situation that is
antithetical to Locke's philosophy. Thus, Locke is likely to reject the premise that
engenders this odious result. Therefore, Locke likely would not classify nationalism as a
religion.
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pledge opponents in the above mentioned ways, he would not be able to
controvert the assertion that the reaffirmation of the pledge resolution
could jeopardize national security and civil peace. However, he would
note that national security and civil peace may also be jeopardized by the
nullification of the resolution. With similar hazards associated with both
actions, Locke would likely defer to the action that poses the least threat
to security and peace.300 Since this action is likely to be that which most
closely harmonizes with his philosophy, the plethora of problems
associated with the arguments of the pledge opponents would likely
induce Locke to side with the pledge proponents and reaffirm the pledge
resolution.
4. Analysis: Thomas Hobbes
With Mill and Locke rendering contrary decisions, the opinion of
Hobbes will determine the manner in which the SSPPC disposes of
Barnette. A basic principle of Hobbesian philosophy is that the
sovereign must rule supremely if society is to flourish. 301 At first blush,
this maxim may induce readers to think that the laws created by the
sovereign are absolute, meaning that the mandatory pledge resolution
implemented by the West Virginia Board of Education, a quasi-sovereign
body, must be upheld. However, such an interpretation is misguided.
Hobbes believes that the only way to produce peace and security in
the commonwealth is to permit the sovereign to create and enforce the
laws.302 Otherwise, a plethora of individuals will attempt to proclaim
what is right, giving rise to an abundance of differing and competing
ideas regarding what the law should be.30 3 Ultimately, this invites
discord, competition for power, and interpersonal conflict.30 4 Not only
must society entrust the sovereign with the exclusive power to dictate the
laws in order to promote peace and security, it must also prohibit any
individual or groups of individuals from challenging the authority of the
sovereign.30 5
This does not mean that individuals cannot successfully challenge
particular laws ratified by the sovereign. Since the main task of the
sovereign is to promote peace and security, the sovereign reserves the
right to repeal laws that do not promote the attainment or maintenance of
300. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (explaining that the desire for security
is the impetus for forming the commonwealth).
301. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 203.
305. See supra note 203.
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those ends.3°6 The sovereign may not be aware of the social affect of a
law until it is implemented or until its shortcomings are made known to
him. The entrustment of judicial powers to the sovereign indicates that
Hobbes expected individuals to bring the detrimental aspects of laws to
the attention of the sovereign in a civil manner. Undoubtedly, Hobbes
would prefer that individuals address detrimental aspects through judicial
mechanisms, as opposed to taking matters into their own hands and
committing violent acts of renegade vigilantism.
30 7
Thus, the combination of the sovereign's ability to repeal
detrimental laws, Hobbes' anticipation of individual challenges to the
laws, and the benefit of making these challenges through judicial
mechanisms supports the assertion that Hobbes would permit individuals
to challenge the prudence of specific laws.30 8 However, his concern for
the integrity of sovereign authority309 would probably induce him to limit
legal challenges to instances where those challenges do not question the
general authority of the sovereign to legislate. With this said, it is at least
feasible that Hobbes would rule against the West Virginia Board of
Education.
Familiarly, proponents of the mandatory pledge resolution would
justify the pledge by asserting that it promotes national unity and
security. Arguably, the repeal of the resolution would permit the
fragmentation of national unity, which would produce a multitude of
competing theorists brandishing a plethora of remedies. This
competition would produce the tension, conflict, and discord that Hobbes
seeks to avoid. Domestic instability and insurgency would threaten
national security, thereby jeopardizing individual security. Since
individual security is both the impetus for departing from the state of
306. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
307. Acts of vigilantism would be discouraged because they would present challenges
to the ability of the sovereign to govern generally, as they would promote lawlessness
and chaos. However, utilizing judicial mechanisms to remedy detrimental aspects of
specific laws presents a challenge to that specific act, not to the ability of the sovereign to
govern generally.
308. Since security requires individuals to obey the sovereign in all things, see supra
note 200 and accompanying text, Hobbes would likely permit challenges to laws
provided that those challenges do not manifest disobedience to the law while the law is
still in effect. For instance, if I wanted to challenge a ban on smoking in restaurants, I
could file a law suit, but I could not smoke in a restaurant while the challenged law was
still in effect. If I did, Hobbes probably would not deprive me of my legal challenge, but,
in order to preserve security and order in society, he would assert that I should be
punished for violating an enacted law. See supra notes 173, 203 and accompanying text
(explaining that the people owe loyalty to the sovereign because challenges to the
sovereign's authority jeopardize the security of all members of the commonwealth).
309. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (explaining that the authority of the
sovereign cannot be compromised if the commonwealth is to survive).
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nature and the objective of civil society, 3' ° Hobbes would likely avoid
any course of action that tended to endanger it. 31' Therefore, pledge
proponents would argue that Hobbes would not invalidate the pledge
resolution.
Reminiscent of their appeal to Locke, proponents of the pledge
resolution could also argue that the resolution does not threaten the
beliefs of the Jehovah's, nor does it fail to tolerate those beliefs. After
all, the resolution does not ban the beliefs of the Jehovah's, or prohibit
the Jehovah's from attending school; it merely bans a specific act
(refusing to recite the pledge) associated with those beliefs.3" 2 Like
Locke, Hobbes believes that the domain of religious beliefs is essentially
an internal one. 3  For Hobbes, outward actions do not accurately reflect
internal beliefs, nor can they be the basis for religious condemnation.
31 4
Thus, the recitation of the pledge does not reflect or coerce internal
beliefs. Since recitation of the pledge does not mandate the
abandonment of inner faith, it does not force the Jehovah's to sin and
therefore does not jeopardize their eternal salvation.
Given that compliance with the pledge resolution does not
jeopardize the eternal salvation of the Jehovah's, pledge proponents
would assert that the issue the Jehovah's have with pledge compliance is
minor. On the other hand, since national and individual security is
promoted by the affirmation of the pledge resolution, and since security
is necessary for the survival of civil society, pledge proponents would
assert that the issue they have with disobeying the pledge is major. Thus,
pursuant to the Fifth Law of Nature,315 the pledge proponents would
argue that the Jehovah's should engage in accommodation by
acquiescing to the mandates of the pledge resolution.
The opponents of the pledge resolution would respond by noting
that while the duty to obey one's conscience cannot supersede one's duty
to obey the sovereign,31 6 the failure to do the latter likely does not
310. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. Proponents of the pledge
resolution would assert that disobeying the resolution violates the First Law of Nature
because it is an act of renegade vigilantism that challenges the ability of the sovereign to
maintain peace and order. The duty to obey one's conscience is superseded by the duty
to obey the sovereign in all aspects that enable him to maintain peace and order. See
supra note 195 and accompanying text.
312. See Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-30 (1943).
313. See supra note 206.
314. See supra note 205.
315. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fifth Law of
Nature holds that individuals should attempt to accommodate others when others have
minor issues with the contract).
316. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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preclude one from legally challenging the law that one disobeyed.317
Thus, pledge opponents would argue that while the disobedience of the
children in Barnette would warrant punishment, 318 it would not preclude
them or their guardians from legally challenging the pledge resolution.1 9
Pledge opponents would claim that the affirmation of the resolution
would violate the First Law of Nature, as it would incite civil unrest,
which would dissolve national unity.320 The dissolution of national unity
would give rise to a multitude of competing theories brandishing a
plethora of remedies. This would produce the tension, conflict, and
disagreement that civil society seeks to avoid. Domestic instability and
insurgency would threaten national security, thereby jeopardizing
individual security. Since individual security is both the impetus for
departing from the state of nature and the objective of civil society,
Hobbes would refrain from any course of action that endangers it.321
Thus, according to the pledge opponents, Hobbes should avoid repealing
the pledge resolution.
Alternatively, the pledge opponents may base an argument on the
Second Law of Nature, which inherently recognizes the right of self-
preservation in the context of reciprocity. 322 They could contend that the
right to self-preservation extends beyond physical preservation and
includes the preservation of all aspects of one's identity. Since the
317. After all, if violating a law precluded one from legally challenging it, citizens
would become extremely cautious, for fear of losing their ability to sue. As a result of
this extreme caution, many laws would never get broken. This may sound beneficial, but
the detrimental effects of some laws may not become apparent until they are transgressed.
Failing to transgress these laws would mean that their detrimental effects would never be
known. Consequently, they would never be legally challenged. Thus, these detrimental
laws would be enforced in perpetuity. This becomes problematic when detrimental
secular laws violate the laws of nature. Pledge opponents would argue that Hobbes
would never agree to anything that would perpetuate violations of natural laws. See
supra note 186 and accompanying text (explaining that the natural laws form the basis of
morality). Thus, they would argue that the violation of a secular law should not preclude
one from legally challenging that law. In response to contentions that such a scheme
would promote lawlessness, pledge opponents would assert that the punishment
accompanying the violation of the secular law would be sufficient in deterring
lawlessness and chaos. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (justifying
punishment of those who transgress certain laws).
318. Arguably, they received their punishment when they were suspended from
school.
319. See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
320. See Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) ("No deeper division of
our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose
what [religious] doctrine ... public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in
embracing.").
321. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
322. People only agree to cede their rights to the government insofar as others agree
to do the same because their lives and security would be jeopardized if they were not on
equal footing with others. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 72.
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prayer resolution suppresses the identity of the Jehovah's, 32 3 this right
enables them to resist the prayer resolution. Denying their challenge of
the pledge resolution denies the Jehovah's their right of self-preservation
and in doing so, it impermissibly gives civil law precedent over the laws
of nature. Thus, the pledge opponents would conclude that the pledge
resolution should be invalidated.
Since the pledge resolution vicariously burdens the identity of the
Jehovah's, the pledge opponents would assert that the Jehovah objection
does not revolve around a "minor" issue. Certainly, anything that
touches upon aspects of one's fundamental existence must be deemed a
"major" concern. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the pledge
proponents, pledge opponents would claim that the failure of the
Jehovah's to accommodate the pledge does not violate the Fifth Law of
Nature because that law only mandates accommodation when disputes
revolve around minor issues.
3 24
While arguments on both sides are compelling, a close examination
of Hobbesian philosophy indicates that Hobbes would likely perceive a
major weakness in the arguments proffered by the pledge opponents. In
particular, Hobbes would attack the arguments based in the Second and
Fifth Laws of Nature. The argument from the Second Law of Nature is
grounded upon the assumption that the right to self-preservation extends
beyond physical preservation and includes the preservation of anything
comprising one's identity, thusly giving people the right to preserve
beliefs when they come under assault. However, this assumption is
unsupported by anything in the Leviathan.
325
All textual references to "self-preservation" associate that phrase
with tangible entities.32 6 For example, Hobbes states that people in the
state of nature live in perpetual fear of violent death.327 Thus, when he
claims that the desire for self-preservation stimulates their departure
from the state of nature and their entrance into civil society, he associates
"self-preservation" with human life, something tangible. Additionally,
with reference to the laws of nature generally, Hobbes states that they are
"precept[s] ... found out by [r]eason, by which man is forbidden to do
that which is destructive of his life, or take away the means of preserving
[it]." 328 In this statement, Hobbes again associates self-preservation with
the preservation of bodily security.
323. It suppresses their identity to the extent that it prevents them from expressing a
concept essential to who they are as a people.
324. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
325. See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
326. See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
328. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 72.
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These examples make it clear that Hobbes intimately correlated the
concept of "self-preservation" with the preservation of individual life and
physical security, tangible entities. At no point in the Leviathan does he
associate "self-preservation" with intangible entities such as beliefs or
identity. 329 Thus, it is unlikely that he would extend the concept of self-
preservation beyond physical preservation. With this said, the Jehovah's
right of self-preservation would not include the right to defend their
beliefs or any other intangible component of their identity. Therefore,
even if the pledge resolution suppresses aspects of the Jehovah's identity,
it would not violate their right to self-preservation. For this reason, the
pledge opponents' argument regarding the Second Law of Nature must
be rejected.
Additionally, since the preservation of one's identity does not fall
under the penumbras of the Second Law of Nature, it is not likely that
Hobbes would consider it a "major" concern.330  Thus, Hobbes would
likely assert that, pursuant to the Fifth Law of Nature, the pledge
opponents must accommodate the pledge resolution.331
In light of the weaknesses identified in the arguments of pledge
opponents, Hobbes would ultimately rule in favor of the West Virginia
Board of Education by affirming the mandatory pledge resolution.
5. The Decision of the SSPPC
To summarize, Mill would rely on utility in weighing the benefits
and disadvantages associated with the pledge resolution. Since nullifying
that resolution would produce utility, while reaffirming it would produce
disutility, the scales would tip in favor of nullifying the resolution.332 For
Locke, the dispositive element would be fidelity to his concept of the
ideal commonwealth, which include notions of paternalism and security.
Since the arguments for nullifying the resolution strain his philosophy,
he would conclude that the arguments for reaffirming the resolution
possess more fidelity. 333  Lastly, Hobbes would base his decision on
fidelity to the laws of nature. Since arguments for nullifying the
resolution involve more violations of the laws of nature than do
329. See generally HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 23.
330. Compare supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text with supra notes 327-30
and accompanying text (implying that Hobbesian philosophy emphasizes the preservation
of life and physical security, things which are "major" concerns in light of Hobbes'
emphasis on security).
331. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. After all, the concerns of the
Jehovah's would be "minor," but the concerns of the state (national unity and national
security) would be "major" concerns. Thus, Hobbes would likely assert that the Fifth
Law of Nature mandates accommodation on the part of the Jehovah's.
332. See supra § (III)(A)(II).
333. See supra § (III)(A)(III).
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arguments for reaffirmation of the resolution, Hobbes would ultimately
vote in favor of the latter.334
Thus, in a 2-1 vote, the SSPPC would render a decision favorable to
the West Virginia Board of Education by reaffirming the pledge
resolution. This decision directly contradicts the decision of the United
State Supreme Court and provides some indication that American
jurisprudence lacks fidelity to the philosophies that influenced the
framers of the Constitution. With this in mind, attention can be turned to
the issue of school sanctioned prayer in order to determine if the SSPPC
would agree with the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court
in that arena.
B. School Sanctioned Prayer, Lee v. Weisman 335
1. Summary
Daniel Weisman, on behalf of himself and his daughter Deborah,
objected to the custom of having a clergy member deliver an invocation
and benediction at the graduation ceremony of Nathan Bishop Middle
School, from which Deborah, fourteen, was graduating. 36 Robert E.
Lee, school principal, ignored this objection and invited a rabbi to deliver
the invocation and benediction [collectively referred to as the "prayer"]
at the graduation ceremony.337 As was custom, prior to the ceremony,
Lee provided the rabbi with a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Civic
Occasions" [the Guidelines], which "recommended that public prayers at
nonsectarian civic ceremonies be composed with 'inclusiveness and
sensitivity,' though it acknowledged that '[p]rayer of any kind may be
inappropriate on some civic occasions.' 338 With this knowledge, the
rabbi crafted a prayer 339 that contained many religious allusions,
including references to "God" as a parental figure who requires us to live
righteously 340 and who gives us strength, guidance, and the capacity for
learning.
34 1
Although attendance at the graduation ceremony was not required in
order to receive one's diploma, the Court noted that it was obligatory in
334. See supra § (lII)(A)(rv).
335. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
336. Id. at 581.
337. Id.
338. Id. (The rabbi was also notified that the ceremony would be nonsectarian).
339. Each of which lasted no longer than a minute. Id. at 583.
340. Id. at 581-82 (explaining that people should live justly, humbly, and with
mercy).
341. Id. at 582.
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essence.342 The Court observed that the Constitution, at a minimum,
guarantees that the government will not compel anyone to "support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
'establishes a [state] religion ... or tends to do So."'' 34 3  Since the
ultimate decision maker, Lee, was an employee of the state, the Court
concluded that his potentially divisive decision 344 to include the prayer in
the graduation ceremony was attributable to the state. 345 The Court had
already established that the governmental imposition of official prayers
in public schools was unconstitutional.346 In Weisman, the Court
observed that furnishing the rabbi with "the Guidelines" displayed
sufficient governmental control over the prayer's content so as to render
it "imposed" by the government.
347
Having established the imposition of the prayer as a state act, the
Court considered the religious nature of the prayer.348 Although
enduring offensive speech is an important aspect in learning to live in a
tolerant pluralistic society, the Court claimed that justifying the prayer as
an opportunity for children to cultivate their ability to tolerate
unappealing ideas ignores the fact that the First Amendment protects
speech and religion through different vehicles. 349 "Speech is protected
by insuring its full expression even when the government participates,"
while the freedom of religion does not recognize the right of the state to
intervene in certain religious affairs.35 °
Therefore, the Court asserted that freedom of religion could not
justify the actions of the school district, whose supervision over the
graduation ceremony could give reasonable dissenters the impression
that the government was requiring elementary students to participate in
342. Id. at 586. The Court later insinuated that this obligatory nature may emanate
from the pressure to stand as a group and be with classmates. Id. at 593.
343. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
344. Id. at 587-88 ("The potential for divisiveness is of particular relevance here ...
because [the decision regarding the prayer] centers around an overt religious exercise in a
secondary school environment where ... subtle coercive pressures exist."). See infra
note 376 and accompanying text (explaining that the coercion emanates from social
pressure to conform to tradition).
345. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992).
346. See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
347. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (noting that the rabbi would likely
comply with governmental guidelines so as to avoid drawing the ire of the government,
which might tarnish his reputation in the community).
348. Id. at 587-88.
349. Id. at 591.
350. Id. at 591-92 (The state is proscribed from interfering in matters of religion and
conscience because "[i]n the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant
expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. A state-
created orthodoxy puts at great risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the
sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.").
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and approve of certain religious worship.35'
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that the interaction of peer
pressure with the impressionability of adolescence makes school aged
children increasingly susceptible to peer pressure. 352 Thus, the children
themselves may have felt that their participation in the prayer and
acceptance of the religious views contained therein was mandatory.353
For these reasons, the Court held that the school board violated the
Establishment Clause by creating a situation that tended to establish a
state religion.35 4
2. Analysis: John Stuart Mill
Opponents of the school prayer could make the following utilitarian
arguments in defense of their position. Even when compliance to
government mandates are not mandatory or coerced, any government
imprimatur on religion or irreligion suggests that those who do not
adhere to sanctioned beliefs are outside governmental favor.355 Such a
"stamp of approval" could convey the impression that the beliefs of
cynics are wrong. This could induce paranoia in the minds of cynics, as
they might begin to fear for their physical safety or might start to
question the sincerity with which their political interests are considered.
Fear and paranoia would detract from the attainment of utility35 6 and
thus, opponents of school prayer would assert that the prayer policy
should be rejected on these grounds.
Additionally, if cynics interpret government action to insinuate that
their beliefs are wrong, they may acquiesce by altering their beliefs to
conform to the governmental imprimatur in the hopes of gaining
government approval. Opponents of school prayer could argue that such
a situation produces disutility because it deprives society of the
dissenting viewpoints upon which social progress is based. Individuals
would no longer have the opportunity to contrast dominant social beliefs
against the extinct beliefs.357 This would deprive society of the utility
gleaned from the sincere consideration of all viewpoints, a deprivation
that would ultimately obstruct social progress. Opponents of school
351. Id. at 593 (noting that most students understood the act of standing and
remaining silent during the rabbi's prayer as participation in that prayer).
352. Id.
353. See id. at 593-94.
354. Id. at 599.
355. See id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
356. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining that suppression of an
opinion prevents society from gaining a clearer perception of the truth because it inhibits
society from contrasting truth with error).
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prayer would argue that the prayer policy should be invalidated on these
grounds.
Additionally, prayer opponents would note that the detrimental
effects of the prayer policy are felt not only by those whose beliefs differ
from the beliefs espoused by the prayer; detrimental effects are also felt
by those sharing the beliefs espoused by the prayer. Prayer opponents
would assert that the secular adaptation of religious beliefs may result in
the dilution, contamination, and bastardization of those beliefs.358 To the
extent that state endorsement induces dissenters to abandon their beliefs,
adherents of the endorsed belief system would lose the opportunity to
reinforce their beliefs by contrasting them against dissenting beliefs.
This would prevent them from recognizing and reaffirming the truth that
follows from this contradistinction. This may cause them to lose sight of
what they truly believe,359 which may cause the bastardized belief system
to go unquestioned. This hurts the adherents of the endorsed belief
system because their true beliefs may become extinct. It also hurts
society because mechanical adherence to the bastardized belief system
prevents individuals from cultivating the ability to identify and pursue
that which produces maximum utility.360 Thus, prayer opponents would
argue that the prayer policy is disadvantageous to them as well as to
prayer proponents.
While these arguments are persuasive, Mill would likely reject them
and support the school prayer policy for the following reasons. He
would first note that every individual has the right to live his own life as
he sees fit, provided that he does not interfere with the right of others to
do the same.361 Thus, Mill would claim that the school prayer policy
should be upheld so long as it does not harm the rights of others to live
their lives according to their own dictates. Mill would conclude that the
prayer policy does not inflict this type of harm.
To produce "harm," an action must produce a significant material or
non-material misaffection inflicted through the failure to observe a
negative duty.362 The determination regarding whether or not the prayer
policy was a "misaffection" seems to hinge upon whether or not one
considers standing quietly during the prayer to be an act of assent to the
beliefs contained therein. If it qualifies as assent, dissenters are certainly
left in a worse position because their liberty of conscience has been
compromised. To the contrary, if standing quietly does not imply
358. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (positing
this idea).
359. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 41.
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consent, it is hard to see how dissenters would be left in a worse position,
as their liberty of conscience would be preserved.363
In contemplating the nature of quietly standing during the prayer
recitation, Mill would conclude that this act is not an act of assent to the
364beliefs espoused in the prayer. If every respectful observance of or
reflection upon a set of beliefs constituted implicit agreement with those
beliefs, people would never be willing to observe or reflect upon the
ideas of others because doing so would be a renunciation of those beliefs
which they hold dear. If this were the case, ideas would never truly be
exchanged, discussed, or debated. Citizens would lose sight of the
convictions informing their beliefs365 and would be deprived of the
advantages of incorporating other beliefs into their way of life.36 6 This
would ultimately produce social stagnation, as the inability to accurately
identify and pursue utility would stunt social progress.3 67  Thus, Mill
would not consider the act of quietly standing during the prayer to
condone the words or beliefs contained therein. Consequently, Mill
would not consider that act a "misaffection," meaning that it does not
produce harm. Therefore, it would not inhibit the right of dissenters to
live their lives as they so choose.
With regard to the arguments proffered by the opponents of the
customary graduation prayer, Mill would note that their arguments are
based upon the presumption that the prayer constituted governmental
endorsement of religion. He would dispute that assumption by asserting
that the prayer, rather than signifying the endorsement of religion,
363. One may argue that the physical compulsion to stand in silence during the
invocation may constitute a misaffection, as it may produce physical discomfort or leave
some people with less energy. However, it is unlikely that Mill would consider this a
misaffection. The graduation exercises have traditionally included the prayer and thus,
the people in the community are most likely aware of this. Its prevalence, combined with
other experiences the people have had with graduation ceremonies, probably puts them
on notice that it is customary to stand in silence during an invocation or benediction.
Mill would argue that their voluntary attendance at the graduation exercises manifests
consent to all of the foreseeable consequences accompanying the exercises. Thus, any
discomfort they experience resulting from foreseeable aspects of the graduation exercises
(namely the prayer) cannot constitute harm because the people in attendance have
consented to the foreseeable aspects. See supra note 42 (explaining that harm cannot be
inflicted upon those that consent). While this theory would apply to the inclusion of the
prayer in the graduation exercises, it would not extend to the specific content of the
prayer because that would be unforeseeable.
364. He could characterize the act as a respectful observance of and quiet reflection
upon a set of beliefs. After all, he believes that sincere deliberation of differing beliefs is
essential to utility. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (explaining that the lack of debate
leads to mechanical acceptance of the beliefs which leads people to lose sight of why
they hold that belief).
366. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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represented a governmentally sanctioned opportunity for citizens to gain
exposure to beliefs that are conducive to the debate upon which dissent
and social progress are based.368 Unlike Barnette, where the punishment
of cynics could easily give the impression that the cynics held disfavored
beliefs, there is nothing in Weisman that indicates that the prayer was
anything more than an opportunity for people to gain exposure to a
certain set of beliefs,369 opportunities that the government reserves the
right to provide.37°
Furthermore, Mill would assert that the government cannot sanitize
its presentation of an idea much more than it did in Weisman, as there
comes a point where the dilution of an idea renders it an inaccurate
embodiment of the original idea. If every situation involving the
sanitized governmental presentation of a religious idea is considered an
endorsement of that idea, the government would be divested of its right
to educate its citzenry. This would jeopardize the intellectual
marketplace, which would jeopardize the preservation of dissent and the
utility produced by that dissent.37'
Thus, Mill would argue that it is in the interest of utility to reject the
arguments proffered by the opponents of school prayer and to tolerate the
prayer as a mechanism aiding the preservation of dissenting view points,
368. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (Mill justifies the governmental
power to educate children by claiming that it trains them in the ability to accumulate
knowledge and sift through divergent ideas so that when they reach adulthood they can
choose for themselves the tenets and beliefs that produce maximum utility. This
individual choice creates the individuality and dissenting opinions upon which social
progress is based. From this, one could reason that Mill would support government
actions that were conducive to aiding individuals in their choices. Such "educational"
endeavors would ensure that there was a meaningful choice to be made-i.e., that there
were in fact competing ideas upon which individuality and dissent could be based. After
all, governmental education of children would be futile if those children, upon entering
adulthood, were not presented with any meaningful way to exercise that education-i.e.,
if there were no competing ideas from which to choose).
Thus, it appears that the governmental mandate to educate children should logically
be accompanied by a governmental mandate to ensure the existence of a marketplace of
ideas. Mill would argue that the presentation of religious view points in Weisman is an
exercise of the latter right.
369. See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (indicating that the prayer
did not involve coercion, active profession of belief, or punishment of nonconformists).
This lends credence to the assertion that the prayer was not a governmental attempt to
endorse religion or disfavor irreligion. Weisman involved a simple, and arguably
objective, presentation of a particular belief, not a coerced profession of a belief that
clearly indicated governmental religious preference. See id. at 580-82.
370. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (explaining that the government
has the right to train children in the doctrines it believes to be conducive to utility). Thus,
the government could claim that it has a right to teach the beliefs embodied in the prayer
because those beliefs are conducive to utility.
371. See supra note 54.
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372
an act that is imperative for utility and social progress.
3. Analysis: John Locke
For many of the reasons mentioned in Barnette, Locke would not
find anything objectionable in the prayer offered at the graduation
exercises of Nathan Bishop Middle School. Again, proponents of the
prayer would assert that the state has a right to counsel its citizens in
what it believes to be the proper path to righteousness.3 73  They would
argue that there is a secular purpose to the prayer, that being the desire to
dignify and solemnize the day. While Locke condemns the regulation of
religious activities for religious purposes, he permits the regulation of
religious activities when such regulation is incident to laws bearing a
secular purpose.37 4 Thus, while the prayer may serve as a de facto
regulation of dissenting conduct,37 5 such regulation is permissible
because it operates to achieve a secular purpose. Declaring such a
regulation impermissible would make government authority hostage to
the scruples of religious sects. This would permit such a sect to exert its
power and influence over civil interests, 376 a situation which Locke
explicitly condemns.
377
Additionally, even assuming the coercive effects associated with its
de facto nature, prayer proponents could assert that the prayer does not
voice intolerance of the religious convictions of others. After all, it does
not prevent others from holding different beliefs, and, unlike the pledge
372. See supra note 54. It is important to note the fundamental differences between
the pledge resolution in Barnette and the prayer policy in Weisman. The former required
dissenters to actively profess something that they did not believe and provided for the
punishment of those who were not complicit. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
629 (1943). The prayer policy in the latter case did not require active profession of
anything and did not provide for the punishment of anyone. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 580-82 (1992).
373. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
375. It does not serve as a genuine regulation against religious activities because it
does not proscribe or punish any activities running counter to the prayer. At most, the
prayer is a de facto regulation of dissenting opinions because the peer pressure to
conform to school conventions homogenizes conduct and counsels against the
articulation of dissenting viewpoints. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593 (indicating that
people are influenced by social conventions).
376. It would allow objectors to inhibit the ability of the government to counsel its
citizens as to the proper path to righteousness. In this sense, it could prevent the
government from promoting and maintaining civil order, which would threaten the lives
and properties of citizens. Thus, religious or irreligious sects would exert their influence
upon civil matters, a condition that Locke criticizes. Locke would condemn the
elimination of the prayer on these grounds because it would amount to an
acknowledgement of the power that irreligion has over civil interests.
377. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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resolution in Barnette, it does not require the active affirmation of any
beliefs with which one does not agree. 378 Even assuming that the de
facto nature mentioned above operates to prevent the expression of
certain religious beliefs, Locke argues that the expression of religious
beliefs can be curtailed for secular purposes.379 Since the prayer operates
to serve the secular purpose of dignifying and solemnizing the occasion,
any collateral effects it may have on religious activity are permissible
and must be tolerated.
Prayer opponents would counter these arguments by characterizing
the graduation events differently. They would claim that the ostensibly
secular graduation ceremony was transformed into a religious ceremony
through the various acts of the school.380  A prayer traditionally was
recited during the preliminary stages of the Nathan Bishop Middle
School graduation ceremony.381 The content of the prayer was regulated
by the "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" pamphlet given by the principal
to those who were slated to deliver the prayer.382 The particular prayer
challenged by Weisman praised God as providing humans with "strength
and guidance," and thanked God for "keeping us alive, sustaining us, and
allowing us to reach this day., 383 Thus, opponents of the prayer would
argue that the traditional use of the prayer at graduation ceremonies,
combined with the inherent tendency of the prayer to be religious, results
in the transformation of the graduation from a secular ceremony into a
religious ceremony containing religious worship.384 Thus, the prayer
opponents would assert that the prayer policy 385 is invalid because it
378. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 580-82.
379. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
380. What I refer to as "the prayer" contains two inherently religious components, an
invocation and a benediction. "Invocation" is defined as "the act or process of
petitioning for help or support; a prayer of entreaty as at the beginning of a service of
worship." MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 208, at 616. "Benediction" is defined as "the
invocation of a blessing, especially the short blessing with which public worship is
concluded; a Roman Catholic or Anglo-Catholic devotion." MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra
note 208, at 106. Thus, since the components of the prayer are inherently religious, the
prayer itself is inherently religious. This assertion is supported by the fact that the school
principal distributed the "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" so that the prayer would not
offend the religious beliefs of anyone. If the prayer did not inherently tend to be
religious, the consistent distribution of the Guidelines would be unnecessary and
frivolous.
381. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 581.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 582.
384. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (explaining that when indifferent
things are incorporated into religious worship, they gain a religious character). Thus,
prayer opponents would argue that the consistent association of the indifferent graduation
ceremony with the religious overtones expressed in the prayer serves to transform the
ceremony into an act of religious worship.
385. Again, prayer opponents would argue that the prayer is inherently religious, see
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suppresses dissenting viewpoints in order to promote the religious ideals
for which it stands.386
With compelling arguments on both sides of the debate, Locke
could look to policy implications to direct his decision. If one analyzes
the facts closely, it becomes apparent that Weisman does not object to
the prayer on religious grounds, as it does not offend his religion.
387
Rather, his objection to the inclusion of any prayers at the graduation
ceremony is a strong indication that the prayer offended his irreligion.
388
If he were to triumph in this case, the victory could be seen as a triumph
of irreligion over religion. Locke might see this as promoting a culture
of atheism. While Locke promotes the tolerance of many belief systems,
atheism is a belief system to which he does not extend this courtesy.
389
Thus, Locke would rule in favor of Lee by reaffirming the prayer policy
of Nathan Bishop Middle School.
4. Analysis: Thomas Hobbes
Although the prayer in Weisman seems more benign than the pledge
resolution in Barnette, thusly producing the assumption that Hobbes
would uphold it too, a closer examination of Hobbesian philosophy
yields a different result.
Much like the argument proffered in Barnette, proponents of the
prayer would justify it by appealing to the Fifth Law of Nature, which
states that parties must attempt to accommodate differences when
discrepancies revolve around something minor.390 They would claim that
the mere act of standing in silence while a prayer is delivered cannot
negatively affect the beliefs of anyone because beliefs are internal and
cannot be coerced by outside influences. 391  Thus, the mere act of
standing does not pose a threat to the beliefs or eternal salvation of
anyone in the audience. Therefore, that act cannot precipitate any
objections that would be "major" in nature. Since any objections would
merely be minor scruples, and since citizens must obey the sovereign,
who sanctions the prayer, the proponents of the prayer could assert that
the Fifth Law of Nature mandates accommodation on the behalf of those
who object to the prayer.
supra note 380, and has the de facto effect of suppressing dissenting religious viewpoints,
see supra note 375.
386. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that an act cannot
regulate religion for religious reasons).
387. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992).
388. See id.
389. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, proponents of the prayer could make an argument
based on the First Law of Nature, which mandates the pursuit and
attainment of peace and security. 392 They could argue that the act of
joining others in collective prayer unifies participants in an important
way.393 Namely, it immunizes against religious intolerance, prejudice,
and bigotry.394 Preventing people from uniting in this manner deprives
them of an experience that cannot be duplicated.395  This deprivation
could unknowingly provide an opportunity for malcontents to cultivate
religious intolerance and hatred, thereby chinking the armor of national
unity. This would threaten and ultimately diminish national security, in
direct violation of the First Law of Nature. Thus, proponents of the
prayer would assert that the First Law of Nature mandates the
affirmation of prayer during commencement exercise at Nathan Bishop
Middle School.
The opponents of the prayer could counter by proffering their own
arguments as to how the prayer violates the laws of nature. They would
note that the prayer involved a clergy member delivering an incantation
in which he asks God to "send [His] blessings upon the teachers and
administrators [of the school]. 396 The rabbi continued the incantation by
exclaiming, "[w]e give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive,
sustaining us, and allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion.,
397
The prayer opponents could assert that this content would be
objectionable to Hobbes for several reasons. Firstly, in asking for divine
blessings, the rabbi displayed the belief that he had the power to compel
the will of God.398 Secondly, in thanking God for sustaining human life,
the prayer expressed the belief that God was an imminent presence in
this world.399  Lastly, using the prayer to solemnize the graduation
ceremony is repugnant because it is analogous to a consecration, an act
that Hobbes criticizes for its tendency to deceive people into believing
that members of the clergy possess the power to command the immediate
presence of God in this world.4 °0
Hobbes objects to these religious aspects because he believes that
392. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
393. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
394. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
395. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
396. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 582.
397. Id.
398. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (explaining that this is objectionable
because it ushers in the "Kingdom of Darkness").
399. See supra note 200, 209 (explaining that the belief in God's imminence is a
misinterpretation that leads to the "Kingdom of Darkness").
400. See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
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they place people in awe of clergymen.4 ° ' Since this presents a situation
where the sovereign controls the secular while the clergy ostensibly
controls the divine, people are presented with two possible sources of
authority. This confuses the public as to whom they are to obey.
40 2
Consequently, this presents a challenge to the sovereign's monopoly on
temporal power, a monopoly that is necessary if the sovereign is to
promote peace and security. °3 Thus, the prayer opponents could claim
that the prayer should be proscribed because it is inherently inconsistent
with the mandate to pursue and attain peace that is enunciated in the First
Law of Nature. Since peace and security are certainly "major" concerns
for Hobbes, 40 4 prayer opponents would argue that the Fifth Law of
Nature cannot be utilized to compel accommodation from the prayer
opponents. With these arguments, the prayer opponents could
effectively counter the arguments proffered by the prayer proponents.
In assessing these arguments, Hobbes would likely defer to the side
which produces the greater quantum of peace and security. While the
arguments articulated by the prayer proponents are persuasive, Hobbes
does not specifically recognize the validity of those arguments in his
philosophy.0 5 On the other hand, Hobbes does specifically recognize the
406validity of the arguments enunciated by the prayer opponents. Thus,
Hobbes would likely believe that the arguments of the prayer opponents
tend to more consistently produce peace and security. Hence, he would
proscribe the school sponsored prayer in Weisman.
5. The Decision of the SSPPC
To summarize, Mill would rely on his notions of harm and utility in
reaffirming the prayer policy. He would note that the policy does not
inflict harm upon the Jehovah's.40 7 Additionally, he would assert that the
401. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 203.
403. See supra note 203 (Peace and security are promoted by eliminating social
discord.).
404. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (insinuating that security is a "major"
concern of individuals because it the impetus for entering into the state of nature).
405. He does not explicitly recognize that collective prayers promote the unity that
serves to protect national security. See generally HOBBES, LEVIATHAN UNABRIDGED,
supra note 22. Thus, he does not note that the invalidation of such a prayer consistently
jeopardizes national security. See generally id.
406. He does explicitly recognize that consecrations, the belief in the imminence of
God, and the belief that clergymen can invoke God's presence in this world all threaten
national security by calling the supremacy of the sovereign into question. See supra note
209-10 and accompanying text. Since the prayer ostensibly invokes God's presence, see
supra note 399 and accompanying text, Mill would view prayer as a threat to national
security.
407. See supra § (III)(B)(Ii).
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government has a right to educate its children as it sees fit, making the
prayer a governmentally sanctioned opportunity to enrich the intellectual
marketplace thereby producing utility.40 8  Locke would view the
nullification of the prayer policy as a promotion of atheism. Since he
believes that atheism does not deserve toleration, he would reaffirm the
policy.40 9 Finally, Hobbes would rely on his notion of security. Since
his philosophy specifically recognizes that security is produced through
the invalidation of the religious ideas embodied in the prayer, he would
vote in favor of nullifying the prayer policy.
4 10
Thus, in a 2-1 decision, the SSPPC would invalidate the public
school prayer policy of Nathan Bishop Middle School. This decision
directly contradicts the decision of the United State Supreme Court.
Along with the decision of the SSPPC in Barnette, it provides credence
for the assertion that contemporary American jurisprudence lacks fidelity
to the philosophies that influenced constitutional framing and
interpretation.
Section IV: Conclusion
The goal of this Comment was to provide a philosophical analysis
of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence involving governmental
utilization of religion to create a public culture. The purpose of such an
analysis was to discover whether this jurisprudence was in accord with
the socio-political philosophies that influenced the beliefs of our
forefathers and their ancestors. To accomplish this, the present
Comment constructed the "SSPPC,, 411 and applied the philosophies of its
members to two controversial Supreme Court decisions, Board of
Education v. Barnette and Lee v. Weisman. This application yielded
interesting results.
In two 2-1 opinions, the SSPPC disagreed with the Supreme Court's
disposition of both of these cases."' 2 In Barnette, Mill, concurring with
the United States Supreme Court, voted to invalidate the pledge
resolution of the West Virginia Board of Education."' 3 However, both of
his colleagues joined together in voting to reaffirm the pledge
resolution.4"' In Weisman, Locke teamed with Mill in reaffirming the
408. See supra § (III)(B)(I).
409. See supra § (III)(B)(ii).
410. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
411. As a reminder, the SSPPC is a judicial body composed of John Stuart Mill, John
Locke, and Thomas Hobbes. See supra § I.
412. See supra §§ (III)(A)(v), (III)(B)(v).
413. See supra § (111)(A)(v).
414. See supra § (III)(A)(V).
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prayer policy of Nathan Bishop Middle School.41 5 This left Hobbes as
the sole supporter of the United States Supreme Court's decision to
invalidate the prayer policy.
4 16
These determinations indicate that the SSPPC would not agree with
the restrictions placed upon the American government in its attempt to
utilize religion to promote a public culture. This is not to say the SSPPC
would endorse the adoption of an authoritarian regime that would
consolidate power, limit individual liberty, and squash dissent; however,
it may indicate that the SSPPC would give the government more leeway
in attempting to use religion to create a public culture. For example,
these philosophers may assert that the government can legitimately use
religion to create a public culture provided that this pursuit does not
convey governmental favoritism for or discrimination against any
religion.41 7 Indeed, the intent of the framers has been interpreted to
permit this pursuit4 8 . The constitutional protection of religious freedom
terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious
equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma.,
4 19
This maxim is the star in our constitutional constellation that guides
the three members of the SSPPC toward an equitable balance between
religious freedom and religious establishment. It is this star that guides
the three wise men toward their ultimate goal: the pursuit of life, liberty,
and happiness. 420 The question remains, will we follow their lead?
415. See supra § (III)(B)(v).
416. See supra § (III)(B)(v).
417. Mill may permit such a pursuit insofar as it avoids inflicting harm upon others
because it nurtures the intellectual marketplace, stimulating debate and thereby producing
utility. If citizens alleged that the pursuit conveyed favoritism or discrimination of
religion, the government could deny these averments by claiming that any favoritism or
discrimination was not intentional but was a collateral product of the quest for utility.
Locke would support this pursuit provided that it did not violate formal neutrality-i.e.,
provided that burdens inflicted upon a religion were motivated by public goals and not by
disdain for that religion. If citizens alleged government favoritism or discrimination of
religion, the government could deny these allegations by claiming that any favoritism or
discrimination was not intentional but was the collateral effect of promoting a secular
interest. Hobbes would support such a pursuit to the extent that it complies with the laws
of nature and tends to eliminate social discord by consolidating civil and ecclesiastic
authority in one person. Any favoritism or discrimination of religion would not be
intentional, but would merely be incident to the production of security.
418. See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
419. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
420. The pursuit of life can certainly be attributed to all three philosophers. Mill
would undoubtedly support it because the fear produced in the absence of security for
one's life detracts from utility. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Locke would
pursue it because the preservation of life is a component of the preservation of property,
which is essential to his philosophy. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Hobbes
11232008]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
would support the pursuit of life because he believes that the desire to secure one's life is
the basis for the creation of the commonwealth. See supra note 163 and accompanying
text. Liberty likewise would be a pursuit attributable to all three philosophers. Mill exalts
individual liberty to the extent that it does not harm others. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text. Locke asserts that liberty is a viable civil concern that the
government may legitimately promote. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Hobbes asserts that individuals perfect their freedom by entering into the social contract.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text. Lastly, the pursuit of happiness is also a
pursuit attributable to all three philosophers. Happiness is the definition of utility, so it
undoubtedly becomes a pursuit for Mill. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
Locke pursues happiness through entrance into civil society. See supra note 90
(explaining that entrance into civil society provides security, which eases concerns
regarding the safety of one's life and possessions, which assumedly leads to happiness).
Likewise, Hobbes pursues happiness through the formation of the commonwealth, which
extracts individuals from the despair and war associated with the state of nature. See
supra note 159 (insinuating that entrance into civil society quells despair and provides
peace, which assumedly leads to happiness).
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